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What is metaphysics? 
 
As part of the Protestant Reform, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and with it metaphysics 
generally, fell, or was brought into, disrepute. The reason for this is a ‘paradigm-shift’ in 
the understanding of what it is for a thing to be what it is.  
 
Think for a moment yourself back into your childhood experience. Children often play by 
imagining that they are doctors, nurses, mothers, fathers, cowboys and Indians etc. 
Remember what happened what happened when you refused to ‘be’ what you were 
supposed to ‘be’ – say Indian. You challenged the authority of whoever had tacitly or 
aloud determined ‘what you were’. By this challenge you risked disrupting the game, if 
the other (or the others) was (were) not prepared to accept you as a cowboy. By 
challenging what you were, you thus challenged not only who was in charge of the game, 
and the integrity of the game itself. Of course change in leadership could happen without 
the game being disrupted – games indeed often are about that – but it all would depend 
on the parties involved. That is why you liked to play with some and not with others. 
 
Parents like their children to play, also because it is the best way for them to learn things 
that cannot be taught, but which are of absolute importance in life. 
 
The Protestants had challenged who they were (quasi subjects of the Pope), and who was 
in charge of the game (the Pope). They started playing a new game, in which they were 
the subjects of the Prince, who thus was in charge of the game. This is how the Europe of 
Nation-States became consolidated over a century (1536 – 1642). In so far as 
metaphysics had been the way in which ‘being’ was understood, explained and analyzed 
in the old game, it was now looked upon with suspicion. A suspicion, in fact, that in the 
case of Hobbes (Leviathan, IV, 46), grew to a condemnation of it as treacherous, because 
it gave the subjects of the Sovereign a way to know being (know what is) which were not 
dependent on his authority.  
 
Hobbes says metaphysics consists in right limiting of the most universal significations, 
such as body, time, place, matter, form, essence, subject, substance, accident, power, act, 
finite, infinite, quantity, quality, motion, action, passion “and divers others, necessary to 
the explaining of a mans Conceptions concerning the Nature and Generation of 
Bodies.”(p. 688). 
 
He also gives two senses to metaphysics:  
1. It is the books written or placed in the work of Aristotle after his natural philosophy 
2. But this gives rise to the Schools teaching them as supernatural philosophy. 
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He then links metaphysics with anti-materialism (which he opposes) and with the 
affirmation of the existence of essences and souls as substantial forms. 
 
Hobbes’ politically founded rejection of metaphysics echoes into the general 
understanding of the subject. It is in fact generally understood to be: 
 
1. It is something that can hardly be understood (dismissive definition). 
2. It is about what is beyond the physical (popular definition). 
3. It is what comes ‘after the Physics’ (Greek or Syriac editors’ definition); i.e. what is 
in the book, nicknamed ‘Meta-physics’, because it in the collected works of Aristotle 
was put after the book called the Physics. 
 
(The order of definitions corresponds to the degrees of familiarity with the subject).  
 
If metaphysics is the content of the books after the physics of Aristotle, we must ask what 
Aristotle himself thought he was dealing with in these books. He, in fact, gives another 
three definitions, which it would take another book to explain the identity of: 
 
1. It is wisdom or knowledge concerning principles and causes (1/Α, 981b). 
2. It is the science of being qua being (IV/Γ, 1005a14). 
3. It is first philosophy, the common presupposition for the sciences 
(VI/Ε, 1025b1 − 1026a32). 
   
We can say: 
4. It is about what is and its reasons (explanations, causes) 
5. It is about: 
 
being το ον Aristotle 
substance ουσια  
explanation αιτιον, αρχη  
essence essentia Aquinas 
existence esse  
truth veritas  
actuality Wirkliches Stein 
potentiality Sein-können  
 
6. And about: form, matter, temporality, causality, identity, identification and in general 
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Metaphysics also being the content of the books that in the edition of Aristotle’s texts 
follow the books on physics (natural philosophy), how does Aristotle define his subject 
matter? He defines it in a threefold manner: 
 
3. It is wisdom or knowledge concerning principles and causes (1/Α, 981b25-982a19). 
4. It is the science of being qua being (IV/Γ, 1004a34−1005a17). 
7. It is first philosophy, the common presupposition for the sciences 




Defining the subject-matter in relation to other branches of knowledge, and in relation to 
what is generally thought. 
 
We have said in the Ethics what the difference is between art and science and the other kindred faculties; 
but the point of our present discussion is this, that all men suppose what is called wisdom to deal with the 
first causes and the principles of things. This is why, as has been said before, the man of experience is 
thought to be wiser than the possessors of any perception whatever, the artist wiser than the men of 
experience, the master-worker than the mechanic, and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the 
nature of wisdom than the productive. Clearly then wisdom is knowledge about certain causes and 
principles. 
Since then we are seeking this knowledge, we must first inquire of what kind are the causes and principles, 
the knowledge of which is wisdom. If we were to take the notions we have about the wise man, this might 
perhaps make the answer more evident. We suppose first, then, that the wise man knows all things, as far as 
possible, although he has not knowledge of each of them individually; secondly, that he who can learn 
things that are difficult, and not easy for man to know, is wise (sense-perception is common to all, and 
therefore easy and no mark of wisdom); again, he who is more exact and more capable of teaching the 
causes is wiser, in every branch of knowledge; and of the sciences, also that which is desirable on its own 
account and for the sake of knowing it is more of the nature of wisdom that that which is desirable on 
account of its results, and the superior science is more of the nature of wisdom than the ancillary; for the 
wise man must not be ordered but must order, and he must not obey another, but the less wise must obey 
him. (Where nothing else is indicated I use the Revised Oxford Translation) 
 
 
The wise man (1) knows things in general; (2) he can learn difficult (abstract) things; (3) 
teach what he has learnt as he grasps its principles; (4) knows what is worth knowing for 
its own sake, and (5) must therefore be obeyed. 
 
Such dealing with the principles and causes of things is what we consider characteristic 
of the wise man, therefore wisdom, which we here pursue (in the books later called 
Metaphysics), deals with principles and causes in this manner. 
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Defining the subject matter in relation to other philosophers’ understanding of 
philosophy. 
 
And it is the function of the philosopher to be able to investigate all things. (..) It is obvious then from these 
considerations too that it belongs to one science to examine being qua being. For all things are either 
contraries or composed of contraries, and unity and plurality are the starting-points of all contraries. And 
these belong to one science, whether they have or have not one common notion. (..) Obviously then it is the 
work of one science to examine being qua being, and the attributes which belong to it qua being, and the 
same science will examine not only substances but also their attributes, both those above named and what 







Defining the subject in transit to the substance-books (7-9/ZHQ) 
 
We are seeking the principles and causes of the things that are, and obviously of things qua being. For there 
is a cause of health and good condition, and the objects of mathematics have principles and elements and 
causes, and in general every science which is ratiocinative or at all involves reasoning deals with causes 
and principles, exact or indeterminate; but all these sciences mark off some particular being – some genus, 
and inquire into this, but not into being simply nor qua being, not do they offer any discussion of the 
essences of the things of which they treat; but starting from the essence – some making it plain to the 
senses, others assuming it as a hypothesis – they then demonstrate, more or less cogently, the essential 
attributes of the genus with which they deal. It is obvious, therefore, from such a review of the sciences, 
that there is no demonstration of substance or of the essence, but some other way of revealing it. And 
similarly the sciences omit the question whether the genus with which they deal exists or does not exist, 
because it belongs to the same line of thought to show what it is and that it is. 
And since natural science, like other sciences, confines itself to one class of beings, i.e. to that sort of 
substance which has the principle of movement and rest present in itself, evidently it is neither practical or 
productive. For the principle of production is in the producer – it is either reason or art or some capacity, 
while the principle of action is in the doer – viz. choice, for that which is done and that which is chosen are 
the same. Therefore, if all thought is either practical or productive or theoretical, natural science must be 
theoretical, but it will theorize about such being as admits of being moved, and only about that kind of 
substance which in respect of its formula is for the most part not separable from matter. (..) That natural 
science, then, is theoretical, is plain from these considerations. Mathematics also is theoretical; but whether 
its objects are immovable and separable from matter, is not at present clear; it is clear however, that it 
considers mathematical objects qua immovable and qua separable from matter. But if there is something 
which is eternal and immovable and separable, clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science, 
- not, however, to natural science (for natural science deals with certain movable things) nor to 
mathematics, but to a science prior to both. For natural science deals with things which are inseparable 
from matter but not immovable, and some parts of mathematics deals with things which are immovable, but 
precisely not separable, but embodied in matter; while the first science deals with things which are both 
separable and immovable. Now all causes must be eternal, but especially these; for they are the causes of so 
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I. Classical Metaphysics 
 
 
Aristotle’s understanding of being 
 
Whatever the status of the dictionary of Aristotle (Book D (Delta) or book V of the 
Metaphysics), it is a dictionary of Aristotelian terms of a profound systematic nature. 
Many terms used throughout the fourteen books of the Metaphysics are listed there in an 
order which may be systematic (it is not alphabetical). So also are some of the terms 
defining the subject matter of first philosophy (prw/th filosofi/a); the terms ‘principle’ 
(arxh\); ‘cause’ (ai)/tion) and ‘being’, (to\ o)/n). 
 
About being it is said that: 
In the long version, 
(using mostly Ross’ vocabulary) 
the term ‘being’ is said (le/getai) about: 
In short, 
(using mostly Hope’s vocabulary) 
being means: 
1. Accidental, occasional or incidental 
being; being which is according to an 
occasion: kata\ sumbebhko/j. Something 
is said to be when it happens to be that 
way. If for example the musician is a 
builder, he is so occasionally because he 
only builds now and then. If he was 
building all the time, he would be a 
builder, and it would no longer be true to 
say that ‘the musician is a builder’, as he 
would no longer be a musician. It is not 
essential to a musician to build; not 
necessary for him to build in order to be 
what he is. 
1. Accidental being, i.e. being, that happens 
to be. 
2. Essential being, which is according to 
itself: kaq )au(to. Something is said to be 
what it is and this it would not be if it were 
not. Essential being is said in all the 
categories (kathgori/a – i.e. according to 
the agora, according to public accusation or 
judgement): for example a house is a 
substance, memory a quality, 3 a quantity. 
This is what the things are according to 
themselves, i.e. what they couldn’t be 
without to be what they are, what you 
could not abstract from them without 
abstracting their meaning, what they are 
necessarily. 
2. Essential being, i.e. being that must be. 
3. True being (a)lhqej); when we say that 
Socrates is intelligent we imply that it is 
3. True being, i.e. being that is true 
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true that Socrates is intelligent. We use this 
sense of being when we claim that 2+2 is 4.
4. About either potentiality (du/namij) or 
actuality (e)ntelexeia) (or both). We say 
for example that Socrates is intelligent, 
both when he is awake and when he is 
asleep. Being thus can be either actual or 
potential, still being what it is. 
4. Potentiality and/or actuality 
  
 
Perhaps we may understand that being has four ‘dimensions’, not four kinds. It is talked 
about in four ways: according to something else, according to itself, according to it being 








Kategoria means ‘according to the agora’: according to the public pronouncements 
(originally accusation). Traditionally translated as a “predicate”; from pre-dicare - ‘said-
about’. The categories are kinds of essential being, kinds of predication. They are said 
about the thing according to itself, about the thing according to ”what it is for X to be 
one” (to\ ti/ h)=n [X] ei)=nai). (There is another (longer) list in Categories 1b25-27). 
Here they are listed as: 
 
What (τι εστι) 
 What sort (ποιον) 
 How much (ποσον) 
 Relative to (προσ τι) 
 Doing (ποιειν) 
 Undergoing (πασχειν) 
 Where (που) 
 When (ποτε) 
 
A predicate is not necessarily an accident, though it can be. It is possible to predicate 
something essential about, say, being in this hall, namely that it is being in a place. When 
I say that being in a hall is being in a place I imply that it is true whether or not there is 
anyone. This means that the essence of a thing also is predicated of it, or, to put it another 
way, that substance is one of the categories. 
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Aristotle’s understanding of being, II 
 
 
Introduction to the ‘Substance-books’, VII/Z, 1 
 
 
The ‘substance-books’ (VII/Ζ – VIII/Η – IX/Θ), are thought to be an independent 
treatise. Werner Jaeger and W.D. Ross both agree that Books I/Α, IX/Κ (1-9), XIII/Μ (9), 
XIV/Ν is the earliest form of the course (perhaps taught at the Lyceum over several years 
and edited by Eudemus). Observation will have it (according to H. Tredennick/Loeb 
edition) that Books I/Α, III/Β, IV/Γ, VI/Ε and (VII/Ζ – VIII/Η – IX/Θ), forms the later 
stage of the course, the rest of the material being from uncertain dates. Tredennick, 
indicating that Book V/Δ refers to terms not used in the Metaphysics, claims that the 
dictionary is “evidently a separate and earlier treatise” (p. xxxi).  
 
The opening sentence of Z, 1, seems to refer back to it:  
 
The term ‘being’ has several senses, which we have classified in our discussion of the number of 
senses in which terms are used (Revised Oxford Translation). 
 
It could, however, also refer back to the discussion of the many meanings of being in 
VI/Ε, 2:  
 
Now, a being as such may be in several ways. One of them, as we saw, is to be accidental; another 
to be true (nonbeing is to be false); besides these, there is the list of categories, that is, what, of 
what sort, how much, where, when, and anything else that ‘being’ as such may mean; also a being 
may be, as such, either potentially or actually (ROT). 
 
Book VI in fact form a kind of introduction to the substance-books. It argues that among 
the four senses of being only two are relevant for metaphysics, because it is the science of 
being qua being (e)pisth/mhj to\ o)\n h(= o)\n). These are being used about what things 
are in them selves (essential being) and being used about either potential or actual things. 
In fact accidental being and being as true has been disqualified during book VI/E, 
because there is no science of the accidental (of what happens to be), and being as true is 
not being qua being. So, if Metaphysics is, what book IV defines it to be, it must concern 
being as such (kaq )auto), whether as actuality (e)nergei/a|) or potential (duna/mei). In 
fact the reason why there is no science of the accidental is that there is no determinate 
potency we can know that produces them. The causes of accidents qua accidents escape 
us. But that we can know cannot be explained simply from being. That is why the 
question how it happens that we can combine and separate in thought – things required in 
order to know and understand truth – is separate from the question of being as being. This 
question has later been understood to be concerned with epistemology (from Aristotle’s 
word from science - e)pisth/mh). 
 
The start of Book VII/Ζ begins afresh, however.  
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There are several senses in which a thing may be said to be, as we pointed out previously in our 
book on the various senses of words; for in one sense it means what a thing is or a ‘this’, and in 
another sense it means that a thing is of a certain quality or quantity or has some such predicate 
asserted of it (ROT). 
 
‘Being’ has many meanings, as we have previously pointed out in our account of the various ways 
in which things are said. For ‘being’ means, on the one hand, what a thing is or a ‘this something’ 
[or subject]; on the other hand, it means that a thing is such, or so much, or any of the other types 
of predicates (Hope). 
 
The term ‘being’ has several senses, which we have classified in our discussion of the number of 
senses in which terms are used. It denotes first the ‘what’ of a thing, i.e. the individuality; and then 
the quality or quantity or any other such category (Tredennick, Loeb). 
 
To/ o)/n le/getai pollaxwj, kaqa/per dieilomeqa pro/teron e)n toi=j peri\ posaxw=j’ 
semai/nei ga\r to\ me/n ti/ e)sti kai\ to/de ti, to\ de\ poion h)\ poson h)\ tw=n a)/llwn 
e(/kaston tw=n ou(/tw kathgoroume/no\n.  
 
The two senses of being are not in any obvious way the two, which were left over from 
the discussion in book IV (essential and actuality/potentiality). It is as if Aristotle here 
attempts to explain what is central about being. Being is: 
 
1. the ‘what’ (ti/ e)sti) and the ‘this’ (to/de ti) and 
2. what is said about it according to the predications (κατηγοριαι).  
 
This distinction is between two senses of being as being, being kaq )a)uto/. It is made in 
the dictionary, but it is not the first distinction made, nor is it the most important. In the 
dictionary the contrast between essential and accidental being is first. But as we have 
discarded accidental being, being kata sumbebhkoj, we are now dealing with what 
things are in (or of) themselves, and what they are, are what they are, which makes them 
a this-something, of such and such a category. 
 
It is evident, says Aristotle, that it is the first of these senses, the ‘this-something’ which 
is the primary sense of being, the central one, because ‘sitting’, ‘at nine o’clock’, and 
‘red’ are dependant on the being which sits, happens at nine and is red. This is why the 
being, being qua being, with which first philosophy is concerned, is substance (ou)sia), 
translated by Hope with ‘primary being’. Primary being, or substance, is primary in 
definition (και λογω), knowledge (και γνωσει) and time (και χρονω). What defines it 
is a predicate that states its essence, not any of its accidents. It is necessarily known 
before any of its accidents, as it identifies them as accidents. Hence the question ‘what is 
being (το ον)?’ is the question: ‘what is substance (ουσια)?’ This, in fact, is Aristotle’s 
decisive step away from Plato. He could have said that primary being is essential being, 
not a ‘this’. However, if predicates are to mean something, and not just anything, (cfr. 
IV/Γ, 4) they must be predicated about something, which is irrespective of what is 
predicated of it. This is substance. And to be what it is, it must be a ‘this’. 
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Aristotle’s Theory of Substance 
 
The start of Book VII/Ζ begins afresh. At the outset of the Substance-books, we are told: 
 
There are several senses in which a thing may be said to be, as we pointed out previously in our 
book on the various senses of words; for in one sense it means what a thing is or a ‘this’, and in 
another sense it means that a thing is of a certain quality or quantity or has some such predicate 
asserted of it (ROT). 
 
‘Being’ has many meanings, as we have previously pointed out in our account of the various ways 
in which things are said. For ‘being’ means, on the one hand, what a thing is or a ‘this something’ 
[or subject]; on the other hand, it means that a thing is such, or so much, or any of the other types 
of predicates (Hope). 
 
The term ‘being’ has several senses, which we have classified in our discussion of the number of 
senses in which terms are used. It denotes first the ‘what’ of a thing, i.e. the individuality; and then 
the quality or quantity or any other such category (Tredennick, Loeb). 
 
To/ o)/n le/getai pollaxwj, kaqa/per dieilomeqa pro/teron e)n toi=j peri\ posaxw=j’ 
semai/nei ga\r to\ me/n ti/ e)sti kai\ to/de ti, to\ de\ poion h)\ poson h)\ tw=n a)/llwn 
e(/kaston tw=n ou(/tw kathgoroume/no\n.  
 
The two senses of being are not in any obvious way the two, which were left over from 
the discussion in book IV (essential and actuality/potentiality). Aristotle here attempts to 
explain what is central about being. He will later in the substance-books discuss 
substance as composed of form and matter (book VIII/H) and as actual or potential/ 
necessary or possible (book IX/Q) Being is: 
 
3. the ‘what’ (ti/ e)sti) and the ‘this’ (to/de ti) and 
4. what is said about it according to the predications (kathgoriai).  
 
This distinction is between two senses of being as being, being kaq )a)uto/. It is made in 
the dictionary, but it is not the first distinction made, nor is it the most important. In the 
dictionary the contrast between essential and accidental being is first. But as we have 
discarded accidental being, being kata\ sumbebhko/j, we are now dealing with what 
things are in (or of) themselves, and what they are, are what they are, which makes them 
a this-something, of such and such a category. 
 
It is evident, says Aristotle, that it is the first of these senses, the ‘this-something’ which 
is the primary sense of being, the central one, because ‘sitting’, ‘at nine o’clock’, and 
‘red’ are dependant on the being which sits, happens at nine and is red. This is why the 
being, being qua being, with which first philosophy is concerned, is substance (ou)si/a), 
translated by Hope with ‘primary being’. Primary being, or substance, is primary in 
definition (kai\ lo/gw), knowledge (kai\ gnw/sei) and time (kai\ xro/n%). What defines 
it is a predicate that states its essence, not any of its accidents. It is necessarily known 
before any of its accidents, as it identifies them as accidents. Hence the question ‘what is 
being (to\ o)\n)?’ is the question: ‘what is substance (ou)si/a)?’ This, in fact, is 
Aristotle’s decisive step away from Plato. He could have said that primary being is 
essential being, not a ‘this’. However, if predicates are to mean something, and not just 
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anything, (cfr. IV/Γ, 4) they must be predicated about something, which is irrespective of 
what is predicated of it. This is substance. And to be what it is, it must be a ‘this’. 
  
 
The Dictionary on Substance (ou)si/a) V/Δ, 8:  
 
 
The term ‘substance’ is used in four ways: Substance means: 
1. About simple bodies (απλα σοματα) 
such as earth, fire, water, and in general 
about all bodies, and the bodies composed 
of them, as well as animals and demons. 
These are called substances because they 
are not said about a substrate (καθ’ 
υποκειμενον), but other things are said of 
them as a substrate. 
1. The (bodily) subject of predication. 
2. About the immanent explanation or 
cause (αιτιον) of a being, which, not being 
predicated of the thing, nevertheless 
explains it. We don’t say, for example, that 
a living being is soul or life. 
2. The immanent cause of a being 
3. About whatever inheres (ενυπαρχειν) 
in beings in the first sense, delimiting them 
and giving them shape and form: whatever, 
if destroyed, destroys the thing as such. Its 
limits, the lines of the surface, the numbers 
(dimensions) of the thing.  
3. The dimensions of a being 
4. About ‘what it was to be’ (το 
τι ην ειναι) a given thing, which is 
determined in its definition (λογοσ). 
4. The essence of a being 
 
Hence, Aristotle says ou)si/a (substance, primary being) has a double sense: It is the 
ultimate subject matter (υποκειμενον εσχατον), and that which, being definitely a this-
something (to/de ti), may have a separate being (χοριστον), like a things form (μορφη) 
or idea (ειδοσ). This is the distinction between ‘primary substance’ (the ultimate subject 
matter) and ‘secondary substance’ (that which may have a ‘separate’ being). 
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Aristotle’s Theory of Substance, continued 
 
 
VII/Ζ, 3: Candidates for Substance 
 
 
Book Ζ is a proper treatise. Having set out to analyze the various senses of being (Ζ, 1), it 
lists the various suggestions for what could count as ‘primary being’ (ουσια) (Ζ, 2), 
suggestions we have already met in the dictionary. Among these, those taught at the 
Academy by Plato (ideas, numbers and sensible beings) and Speusippus (who is said to 
have sought to establish principles for various categories of primary being: unity, 
numbers, magnitudes and soul) are the most important. Aristotle sets out to investigate 
what primary being really is. 
 
Perhaps we can say that whereas the dictionary gives the usual meaning of the word 
(listing simple bodies, intrinsic cause, dimensions and essence), thus analyzing it on a 
linguistic level, Z attempt to explore the logical meaning of the concept. What primarily 
is, can be seen in four ways, slightly altering the perspective each time. Ross translates 
Le/getai d  ) h( ou)si/a a)ll ) e)n te/ttaroi/ ((1028b33) as ‘substance can be applied to 
four main objects’; more literally it would seem to be simply: ‘ousia is said in four’. 
Aristotle is going to discuss to what extent ou)si/a is either of them.  
 
 
‘Substance’ can be 








to four objects: 
(translation by 
Ross) 
It is treated in: 
About the essence 
(το τι εν ειναι), 
which is said to be 
the substance of the 
particular 
(ουσια δοκει ειναι 
εκαστου). 
Being a what 
(το τι εν ειναι) 
The essence Ζ, 4 - 6 
About the universal 
(καθολου), which 
is said to be the 
substance of the 
particular. 
Being a generality 
(καθολου) 
The universal Ζ, 13 - 16 
About the genus 
(γενοσ), which is 
said to be the 
Being a kind 
(γενοσ) 
The genus Ζ, 7 - 12 
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substance of the 
particular. 





And the substrate Ζ, 3 
 
 
The subject of discourse, or the substrate (υποκειμενον) is that about which everything 
else is said, and hence it is thought in the truest sense to be what substance is. We must 
therefore start by investigating it. (Next candidate for substance to be examined will be 
essence (το τι εν ειναι), then kind (γενοσ) and finally the universal (καθολου)). 
 
But what is substrate? That to which everything else is attributed, that about which 
everything else is said, is either matter (υλη), form (μορπηε) or a composition of the 
two. If substrate was matter, it could not be substance, because it would not be separable 
and a ‘this’ (χοριστον και το δε τι) (1029a27). And substance is thought to be precisely 
this. Hence the form (ειδοσ) and the combination seems more suitable candidates for 
being the substrate, if substrate is substance. The combination, however, is posterior to 
both matter and form, so we are left to investigate form, i.e. the essence or the ‘what’. 
The obvious suggestion, then, that substance is substrate, evaporates, because substrate as 
such, without it being something in particular, is unidentifiable, and hence cannot be 




Give two good reasons why is this account of the meanings of substance different from 









Is the idea of a tree a substance? 
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Aristotle’s Theory of Substance, continued 
 
V/Δ, 2: The Causes of Substance 
 
So far we have found out: 
 
1. That first philosophy (metaphysics) is the science of being qua being. 
2. That being means accidental being, essential being, being as truth and actuality/potentiality. 
3. That first philosophy cannot concern accidental being (because there can be no science of it), or being 
as truth, because being as being is not being as truth. 
4. That first philosophy concerns being according to itself, being kaq )au/to\, essential being, being 
according to the categories, and that because substance is that about which everything else is said (or 
predicated), the question ‘what is being?’ really is the question: ‘what is substance?’. 
5. Substance means: the bodily subject of predication, the immanent cause of a being, its dimensions or 
its essence. 
6. It is said (to reside) in the substrate, the universal, the kind or the essence. 
 
We have spoken about the subject of predication, the substrate, the universal, the kind, 
the dimensions and the essence. We can now ask what it is that substance is the 
immanent cause of a thing. To do this, let us start by looking up what ‘cause’ (ai)/tion) 
means in the dictionary, while remembering that metaphysics also was thought to be the 
science of principles and causes. 
 
A cause is said to be 
(Tredennick): 
An explanatory factor 
means from one point of 
view (Hope): 
We call a cause (Ross): There are four causes 
(plus intermediary 
causes) that can apply to 
the same thing: 
That as a result of whose 
presence something 
comes into being (e.g. 
the bronze of a statue). 
The material constituent 
(e)nupa/rxontoj) from 
which (e)c ou(=) a 
thing comes to be. 
 
 
That from which (as 
immanent material) a 
thing comes into being. 
Material cause. E.g. 
letters in a syllable, 
building materials in a 
building, elements in 
bodies, parts in wholes, 
assumptions in 
conclusions.  
Id ex quo Intrinsic cause 
The form or the pattern, 
i.e. the essential formula 
and the classes which 
contain it (e.g. the ratio 
2:1 and number in 
general is the cause of 
the octave) as well as 
the parts of the formula. 
The form (ei)=doj) or 
pattern (para/deigma) 
of a thing, i.e. its reason 
(lo/goj) (and the kind of 
reason) which explains 
what it was to be (tou= 
ti/ h)=n ei)=nai) that 
thing. This kind of 
explanatory factor is 
found in the parts 
(me/rh) of a definition 
(lo/goj).  
The form or pattern, i.e. 
the formula of the 
essence, and the classes 
which include this (e.g. 
the ratio 2:1 and number 
in general are causes of 
the octave) and the parts 
of the formula. 
Formal cause. E.g. what 
it was to be that 
particular whole in the 
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The source or the first 
beginning of change or 
rest (e.g. the man who 
plans is a cause, the 
parent is the cause of the 
child, what produces the 
cause of what is 
produced, what changes 
of what is changed. 
The agent (a)rxh\) 
whereby (o(/qen) a 
change (metabolh=j) or 
state of rest is first 
produced; a decision is 
‘responsible’ for a plan, 
a father ‘causes’ the 
child, and in general, 
any maker ‘causes’ what 
he makes, and any agent 
causes some change. 
That from which the 
change or the freedom 
from change first 
begins. E.g. the man 
who has deliberated is a 
cause, and the father a 
cause of the child, and 
in general the maker a 
cause of the thing made 
and the change-
producing of the change. 
Efficient cause. E.g. a 
seed, a physician, and 
advisor: the factor 
whereby a change or 
state of being is 
initiated.  
 
Id a quo 
 
Extrinsic cause 
The same as ‘end’, i.e. 
the final cause (e.g. as 
the ‘end’ of walking is 
health). 
The end (te/loj) or the 
wherefore (to\ ou(= 
e(/neka). 
The end, i.e. that for the 
sake of which a thing is, 
e.g. health is the cause 
of walking. 
Final cause. The end or 
the good of the other 
causes. 
Extrinsic cause 
All those means towards 
the end which arise at 
the instigation of 
something else (e.g. as 
fat-reducing, purging, 
drugs and instruments 
are causes of health, for 
they all have the end as 
their object, (..)). 
Any intermediate means 
to the end of a series of 
acts. 
All the means that 
intervene before the end, 
when something else has 
put the process in 
motion (..) 
Intermediary causes 
These are roughly all the 
meanings of ‘cause’, but 
since causes are spoken 
of with various 
meanings, it follows that 
there are several causes 
(and that not in an 
accidental sense) of the 
same thing. E.g. both 
statuary and bronze are 
causes of the statue; not 
in different connections, 
but qua statue. However, 
they are not causes in 
the same way, but the 
one as material and the 
other as source of 
motion.  
Since what we call an 
explanatory factor may 
be any one of these 
different aspects of a 
process, it follows 
[happens] (sumbai/nei) 
not only that anything 
actually has several such 
factors which are not 
merely accidental 
differences of meaning 
(as both the sculptor’s 
art and the bronze are 
needed to explain a 
statue as a statue, the 
bronze being its material 
(u(/lh), and the 
sculpturing its agent 
(o(/qen h( ki/nhsij)) 
(..). 
These, then, are 
practically all the senses 
in which causes are 
spoken of, and as they 
are spoken of in several 
senses it follows that 
there are several causes 
of the same thing, and in 
no accidental sense, e.g. 
both the art of sculpture 
and the bronze are 
causes of the statue, not 
in virtue of anything 
else, but qua statue. 
Because cause means 
different things, there 
are more than one cause 
of the same thing. 
 
Of the word ‘category’ 
there are the syllables 
(material cause), the 
intelligibility (formal 
cause), the one who 
coined the term, and 
perhaps the speaker (the 
efficient cause) and the 
purpose for which it is 
spoken, communication 
(the final cause). 
 
That substance is the immanent cause of a thing means that it is either form or matter, and 
as form better explains what it is for a being to be what it was (to ti en einai), what 
explains a being, what causes it to be what it is, is itself.  Being, in a sense, is self-
explanatory. This is why the science of causes and principles (explanatory factors) can be 
the same as the science of being as being. 
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Aristotle’s Theory of Substance, Continued 
 
 
Physics II, 3: The Causes of Substance 
 
Reading this passage, we are struck by its similarity to the passage in the dictionary, we 
have just read. What in fact is the difference between physics and metaphysics, if both 
investigate the causes of things? 
 
Now that we have established these distinctions, we must proceed to consider causes, their 
character and number. Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know a 
thing till they have grasped the ‘why’ of it (which is to grasp its primary cause). So clearly we too 
must do this as regards both coming to be and passing away and every kind of natural change, in 
order that, knowing their principles, we may try to refer to these principles each of our problems. 
(ROT) 
 
In the Physics describes the difference in this way: 
 
the student of nature is concerned only with those things whose forms are separable indeed, but do 
not exist apart from matter. 
Whereas: 
the mode of existence and essence of the separable it is the business of first 
philosophy to define (Phys. II, 2).  (ROT) 
 
In the Metaphysics he describes the difference in terms of metaphysics having to give an 
account of the essence, in contrast with the individual sciences which either start from 
perception or assumes essence as a hypothesis (Metaph. VI/Γ, 1). Hence the student of 
nature must know the essence only “up to a point”: he need not be able to define it, as he 
refers to things under their aspect of coming to be and passing away. Their essence does 
not pass away or come to be, but they do, and they are our objects in the Physics, in so far 
as they are separable things existing in matter not independently of it. This means that the 
essence is what is separable, and hence what metaphysics deals with as distinct from 
physics. The essence, also, is eternal, i.e. outside time.  
 
In Book G, Aristotle puts it this way: 
 
Tredennick: Ross: 
Obviously it is the province of a speculative science 
to discover whether a thing is eternal and immutable 
and separable (xwristo/n) from matter; not, 
however, of physics (since physics deals with 
mutable objects) nor of mathematics, but of a 
science prior to both. For physics deals with things 
which exist separately but are not immutable; and 
some branches of mathematics deal with things 
which are immutable, but presumably not separable, 
but present in matter; but the primary science treats 
of things which are both separable and immutable. 
Now all causes must be eternal (a)i/+dia), but these 
But if there is something which is eternal and 
immovable and separable, clearly the knowledge of 
it belongs to a theoretical science, - not, however, to 
natural science (for natural science deals with 
certain movable things) nor to mathematics, but to a 
science prior to both. For natural science deals with 
things which are inseparable from matter but not 
immovable, and some parts of mathematics deal 
with things which are both separable and 
immovable. Now all causes must be eternal, but 
especially these; for they are the causes of so much 
of the divine as appears to us. There must, then, be 
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especially; since they are the causes of what will be 
visible of things divine (tw=n qei/on). Hence there 
will be three speculative philosophies (filosofi/ai 
qeorhtikai/): mathematics, physics and theology 
(qeologikh/) – since it is obvious that if the divine 
is present anywhere, it is present in this kind of 
entity; and also the most honourable (timiwta/thn) 
science must deal with the most honourable class 
(ge/noj) of subject.  
three theoretical philosophies, mathematics, natural 
science, and theology, since it is obvious that if the 
divine is present anywhere, it is present in things of 
this sort. And the highest science must deal with the 
highest genus, …[no change of paragraph] 
The speculative sciences, then, are to be preferred to 
the other sciences, and ‘theology’ to the other 
speculative sciences. One might indeed raise the 
question whether the primary philosophy is 
universal or deals with some one genus or entity; 
because even the mathematical sciences differ in 
this respect – geometry and astronomy deal with a 
particular kind of entity (fusi/n ei)si/n) , whereas 
universal mathematics applies to all kinds alike. 
Then if there is some other substance (e(tera 
ou)si/a) besides those which are naturally 
composed (fu/sei sunesthkui/aj), physics will be 
the primary science; but if there is a substance 
which is immutable (a)ki/nhtoj), the science which 
studies this will be prior to physics and will be 
primary philosophy, and universal in this sense, that 
it is primary. And it will be the province of this 
science to study being qua being; what it is and 
what its attributes are which belong to it qua being. 
(Metaph. IV/G,1). 
so that the theoretical sciences are superior to the 
other sciences, and this to the other theoretical 
sciences. One might indeed raise the question 
whether first philosophy is universal, or deals with 
one genus, i.e. some one kind of being; for not even 
the mathematical sciences are all alike in this 
respect, – geometry and astronomy deal with a 
certain particular kind of thing, while universal 
mathematics applies alike to all. We answer that if 
there is no substance other than those which are 
formed by nature, natural science will be the first 
science; but if there is an immovable substance, the 
science of this must be prior and must be first 
philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is 
first. And it will belong to this science to consider 
being qua being – both what it is and the attributes 
which belong to it qua being. 
 
This is why the causes are the same in physics as in metaphysics. Metaphysics is prior to 
physics only in so far as another substance exists, which is immutable. The very fact, 
however, that the causes are eternal, places the investigation of them outside physics 
(dealing only with the changes of changeable things). Thus metaphysics is the science of 
principles and causes, and the first of these which is being as such. 
 
 
The various senses of 
substance  
The various candidates of 
substance 
The various causes of 
substance 
Provides us with linguistic 
variation, so that we can 
grasp the meaning of the 
word. 
Provides us with eidetic 
variation, so that we can 
grasp the essence of a thing. 
Provides us with 
ontological variation, so 
that we can know what a 
thing is.  
Gives us insight into 
language 
Gives us insight into 
essence 
Gives us insight into the 
real, whether physical or 
metaphysical 
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Aristotle’s Metaphysics: an Overview 
 
We have seen that: 
 
7. That first philosophy (metaphysics) is the science of being qua being. 
 
Tredennick: Ross: Hope: 
It is wisdom or knowledge 
concerning principles  and causes  
(1/Α, 982a4) 
Since we are seeking this 
knowledge, we must inquire of 
what kind are the causes and 
principles, the knowledge of 
which I wisdom. 
It is wisdom (sofi/a) or rational 
knowledge 
(e)pisth/mh) concerning certain 
basic factors (a)rxa\j) and 
principles (ai)ti/aj). 
It is one science studying being 
qua being and the attributes 
inherent in it qua being 
(IV/Γ, 1005a14)  
Obviously then, it is the work of 
one science to examine being qua 
being, and the attributes which 
belong to it qua being 
It is a single science 
(e)pisth/mhj) that must view 
systematically (qewrh=sai) 
being as being and whatever 
belongs to it (u)pa/rxonta) as 
being 
It is first philosophy, one of the 
three speculative philosophies: 
theology (as distinct from 
mathematics and physics). It 
treats of the separable and 
immutable, and if there is such a 
substance, it will study that 
(VI/Ε, 1025b1 − 1026a 32) 
There must then be three 
theoretical philosophies, 
mathematics, natural science, and 
theology, (..) the first science 
deals with things which are both 
separable and immovable. (..) 
One might indeed raise the 
question whether first philosophy 
is universal, or deals with one 
genus (..). We answer that if there 
is no substance other than those 
which are formed by nature, 
natural science will be the first 
science. 
It is first philosophy (prw/th 
filosofi/a), one of the three 
speculative philosophies 
(filosofi/ai qeoretikai 
qeologikh/), as distinct from 
mathematics (maqhmatikh/) and  
physics (fysikh/). It treats of the 
separable (xwrista/) and 
immutable (a)ki/nhta), and if 
there is such a substance 
(ou)si/a), it will study that. 
 
8. That being means accidental being, essential being, being as truth and 
actuality/potentiality.  
 
We have looked Aristotle’s understanding of being up in his ‘dictionary’ (Δ, 7), seeing 
that he accounts for four different ways that being is said to be, being κατα 
συμβεβεκοσ, being καθ’αυτο, being αληθεοσ and being δυναμισ or εντελεκεια.  
 
9. That first philosophy cannot concern accidental being (because there can be no 
science of it), or being as truth, because being as being is not being as truth. 
10. That first philosophy concerns being according to itself, being kaq )au/to\, essential 
being, being according to the categories, and that because substance is that about 
which everything else is said (or predicated), the question ‘what is being?’ really is 
the question: ‘what is substance?’. 
11. We then looked up substance in the dictionary, and saw that its linguistic senses were: 
the bodily subject of predication, the immanent cause of a being, its dimensions or its 
essence. (Δ, 8). 
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As candidates for being as being (the ontological sense of being) Aristotle considers only 
essential being (being καθ’αυτο), which is on the one hand a ‘this’ (τοδε τι) and a 
‘what’ (τι εστι), and on the other can be said according to the categories (Z, 1). 
Accidental being cannot be the object of a science, and being as truth is not being as 
being. So if metaphysics is to be the science of being as being, it must be about essential 
being whether potential or actual. However, among the categories, substance (τι εστι) is 
the most καθ’αυτο, or the most essential, as ‘sitting’, ‘at five o’clock’, ‘above the door’, 
are not independent beings, but are said about something else. They are said about – 
predicated of – an insect, for example. Because this being is first in definition, knowledge 
and time, the question ‘what is being?’ can be reduced to the question: ‘what is primary 
being?’; ‘what is substance?’ 
 
12. Substance can be said to reside (essentially) in the substrate, the universal, the kind or 
the essence. (Z, 3). 
 
Substance cannot be the subject-matter because then it would not be separable 
(χοριστον). Not being identifiable as something, nothing could be predicated of it. 
Therefore it is more likely to be essence, genus or kind. 
 
13. Substance can be explained in four ways: materially, formally, efficiently and finally 
(ontologically). 
 
But metaphysics is not only about being as being. It is about its causes and principles; 
explanations and origins. There are said to be four kinds of explanation: the material, the 
formal, the efficient and the final. It happens that there are several causes of the same 
thing; of being as being, as well as things’ coming-to-be (Phys. II, 3), there can be four 
kinds of causes. 
 
What of origins (αρχη) or the principles of being as being? All causes are beginnings in 
this sense. Of all them, there must be a first (α, 2). For there to be matter, there must be 
prime matter; for there to be form, there must be a form of forms; for there to be 
generation, there must be a source; and for there to be finality, there must be an end. 
Metaphysics treats of the separable (χοριστα) and immutable (ακινητα), and if there is 
such a substance (ουσια), it will study that (10 26a 30). 
 
So is there such a substantial principle explaining the why of being qua being?  Aristotle 
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What Happened as Metaphysics was Christianized? 
 





What is the In Principio? 
  
To know its essence, we may investigate its causes (explanatory factors):  
 
Materially: A poem recorded in the Riesencodex, copied and assembled at Rupertsberg 
Benedictine Convent, headed by Hildegard, probably in the last years of her life (1177 – 
79). The final hymn of Ordo Virtutum, corresponds to the final ‘audision’ of Scivias 
(1151). Scivias (‘Know the ways!’ concerns the history of salvation, and is the first 
volume of Hildegards Trilogy, also comprising Liber Vitae Meritorum (concerning 
subjective salvation) and Liber Divinorum Operum (concerning objective or cosmic 
salvation). As these two last are exegesis of the last ‘audision’ of Scivias, Ordo Virtutum 
constitutes the center of Hildegard’s work. 
 
Scivias comprises three books: ‘The Creator and Creation’, ‘The Redeemer and 
Redemption’ and ‘The History of Salvation Symbolized by a Building’. The thought – 
though visionary – is therefore systematic or archetectonic (in a way even Aristotle’s had 
not been). Each chapter of the books is an exegesis of a vision, described at the beginning 
and accompanied by an illustration carried out by one of her sisters during her lifetime. 
(The illuminations of the two later works Liber Vitae Meritorum and Liber Divinorum 
Operum are finalised after Hildegard’s death, after the written descriptions of the 
visions.) 
 
The illuminations shown from Scivias are the visions entitled:  
Introduction:  These are true visions flowing from God 
Book One:  1. God enthroned shows himself to Hildegard 
  2. Creation and the Fall 
  3. The Universe and its symbolism 
  4. Soul and Body 
  6. The Choirs of Angles 
Book Two: 1. The Redeemer 
  2. The Trinity 
  3. The Church, Bride of Christ and Mother of the Faithful 
  6. Christ’s Sacrifice and the Church 
  7. The Devil 
Book Three: 1. God and Man (The Fallen Stars) 
  11. The Last days and the Fall of the Antichrist 
  12. The new Heaven and the New Earth  
 
Formally: Harmony (music is the sounding of the perfect numbers of the universe and the 
soul reflecting it. Disorder produces noise, not music), even cosmic harmony.  
 
Efficiently: Written by Hildegard von Bingen no later than 1170, to be performed by her 
Benedictine sisters for the benefit of their relatives and guests, according to how it was 
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‘seen’ in a vision (audision). Brought to us by Sequentia, a German ensemble dedicated 
to the restauration of medieval music. 
 
Finally: An explanation of Ordo Virtutum, Scivias and Liber Divinorum Operum and of 
‘what was in the Beginning’, of the First Principle. 
 
Ordo Virtutum concerns the soul who, presenting its candidature to become virtuous, fails because 
the toil of remaining harmonious in their harmonious company proves too difficult. She falls into 
the embrace of the devil who shouts ‘fatue, fatue quid prodest tibi laborare? Respice mundum, et 
amplectetur te magno honore’. When the soul, desirous of the company of the virtues, repents, the 
queen of the virtues, Humilitas, reminds her that her identity is that of the beloved, and promises 
that the virtues will help her. The devil presents another assault when he discovers the virtues in 
the company of his prey, accusing the virtues of not knowing who they are and what they cultivate 
(tu nescis quid colis (..) unde nesquis quid sis!). The virtues thereafter present who they cultivate 
(God) and themselves to the soul one by one, encouraging her to enter their society, that she may 
defend herself against the devil and finally reject him. The last hymn is the final harmony, which 
sums up ‘what was in the beginning’, and hence what has happened, and how and why. 
 
For Aristotle the first principle is the thought that thinks itself because (XII/Λ, 7): 
• Thought is the highest activity, and the good moves without being moved 
• Thought is most intelligible and best, when it is identified with its object 
• The highest object which the highest activity may have is therefore itself 
• We participate in this when we think, and better when we think about the highest 
object 
 
This Greek insight is assimilated already by John 1,1: 
In the beginning was the Word, and the 
Word was with God, and the Word was 
God. 
Εν αρξη ην ο λογοσ, και ο λογοσ ην πρ
οσ τον θεον, και θεοσ ην ο λογοσ. 
 
John expresses Aristotle’s insight that everything there is, is intelligible in its definition 
(lo/goj), which is what a substance (ou)si/a) has, integrating its genus and species. 
Substance is essentially intelligible. And this is God. 
 
Hildegard expresses John’s insight, expressing Aristotle’s, in the commentary on the 
prologue of St. John (Liber Operum Divinorum, visio 1 - 4). I am is ‘Beginning of 
beginnings’, ‘Reason of reasons’, ‘Form of forms’, ‘Harmony of harmonies’, ‘Life of 
life’. In I am Man is with God the principle of the universe. 
 
When Aristotle is rediscovered and translated after 1200 the similarity of its insights and 
those of Christianity fascinates and frightens. The very difficulty with which Aristotle is 
assimilated in the Christian West is the reason why it becomes impossible to separate the 
two later. A welding occur which makes it difficult to reject one without affecting the 
other. Modern science had a hard time replacing Aristotle’s physics, Luther purged 
Christianity from philosophy, and ‘anti-metaphysics’ rejects essentialism as a kind of 
dogmatism, but no stream of thought has yet managed to separate the two out from one 
another.  
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II.  Christian Metaphysics 
 
 
Thomas Aquinas: De ente et essentia 
 
 
Aristotle showed that being is primarily substance, and that there are four candidates for 
substance (matter, υποκειμενον, essence, το τι εν ειναι, universal, καθολου, and 
genus, γενοσ), whereof we investigated only two, namely matter and essence. But the 
universal and the genus were, like matter and essence, said to be the substance of the 
particular. 
 
This is still the problem of Aquinas: what is being? The First Principle in the Christian 
culture (through the Moslem and Jewish adaptations) had been re-identified as a God of 
which a story was told (the Greek gods were known through their mythical 
accomplishments, but Aristotle’s God was not). It was hence part of popular culture and 
ethics, as well as of social, legal and political organization, illustrated by Hildegard’s In 
Principio. In what way was that to affect Aristotle’s quest for being and primary being, 
i.e. for the enterprise of metaphysics?  
 
In one way not so very much, as philosophical terms, problems and solutions remain 
largely identical throughout different historical circumstances. In another way 
profoundly, as a new coherence seems to consolidate the Aristotelian ideas into a system, 
the principle of which is the tri-personal God expressing himself through His Word and 
Love in Creation as well as Redemption.  
 
The terms, problems and solutions of de ente et essentia are largely the same as those of 
Aristotle. Thomas distinguishes between two senses of being (attributing this distinction 
to Aristotle’s V/Δ, 7, where four senses of being, as we have seen, are distinguished, not 
two): the being (ens) of the categories and that expressed in a true statement. When we 
discuss essence, we discuss, according to Aristotle, an account that defines the essence 
without containing it (VII/Ζ, 4). E.g. the human being is a rational animal. Here we 
combine a genus (animal) with a specific difference (rational) to say that that is what a 
human being is, i.e. that it is true that a human being is a rational animal. It is therefore 
not insignificant that Aquinas after Aristotle claims that essence is not derived from the 
being of truth, but from being in the sense of the categories. He hereby states that 
essence, before it is expressed in an account, is what it is, and hence only something that 
is, and not lacks for example, has essence, even if lacks are talked about, and in that sense 
can be said to be. 
 
This is how Thomas interprets Aristotle’s reduction of being to substance and substance 
to essence. He has swiftly incorporated the neo-platonic semi-dualistic hierarchy of being 
and non-being, attributing intelligibility only to being, not to non-being. (In Aristotle’s 
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dictionary privation, στερησισ, as well as damaged, κολοβον, is defined). The “ladder 
of being” mounting from material inanimate being, through vegetative, animal and 
rational composite being (i.e. being composite of matter and form) to pure spiritual being, 
both composite (in angels) and non-composite (in God), results. This ladder is, because 
only being has essence, also a ladder of intelligibility. In so far as the unintelligible 
(matter, the intelligibility of which consists in its non-intelligibility) recedes, being 
becomes more intelligible. This implies that the being of the non-composite substances is 
more intelligible in themselves (in se, καθ’αυτο, essentially), but not in relation to us 
(secundum quid, κατα συμβεβηκοσ, accidentally). The composite substances are more 
intelligible in relation to us. 
 
In composite substances the essence cannot be reduced to either matter or form or to the 
relation between the two. It is rather what is composed of matter and form. But genus, 
species and specific difference are related precisely to matter, form and the relation 
between the two. The genus is not identical with but derived from matter as signifying a 
whole (e.g. animal). The specific difference (e.g. rational) specifies by the relation 
between matter (the genus) and form (species), and hence they together constitute the 
definition of the species (e.g. rational animal). The genus designates the whole of the 
species, but in an indeterminate manner. This is how it can designate many species, 
without the many species being one and the same. The species is indeterminate in the 
same way in relation to essence (by Thomas here identified with nature), but the species 
has its determinacy in relation to the genus from the form. Likewise with the essence of 
the individual, which is not identical with that of which it is the essence. It has its 
determinacy in relation to the species from the form, and its indeterminacy in relation to 
the individual from matter. Therefore Thomas is said to defend that the principle of 
individuation is matter. 
 
 
Plan of de ente et essentia: 
1. being and essence 
2. essence in composite substances 
3. essence in relation to the concepts of genus, species and difference 
4. essence in non-composite substances 
5. God is being, in him being and essence do not differ 
 
 
There is no genus and species of essences in so far as these are mere parts of the whole, 
and not the whole e.g. humanity is not an essence of a special kind. But human being is. 
 
Therefore essence can be seen in two ways. Humanity has some elements essential to it. 
This way of being essence is neither one nor many, because neither is essential to it.  
Socrates’ essence, however, is not humanity. His essence has two ways of being: in 
Socrates and in the mind. It is as existing in the mind that it can be said to be a kind, 
because Socrates himself is not a kind. Humanity therefore is the kind of essence 
Socrates has, the kind being attributed to Socrates’ essence as it exists in the mind. 
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On being, essence and truth 
 
 
Viso quid significetur nomine essentiae in 
substantiis compositis videndum est quomodo se 
habeat ad rationem generis, speciei e differentiae.  
So now that we have seen what the word essence 
means in composite substances, we must see how it 
is related to the notions of genus, species, and the 
differentiating characteristic. 
Quia autem id, cui convenit ratio generis vel speciei 
vel differentiae, praedicatur de hoc singulari 
signato, impossibile est quod ratio universalis 
scilicet generis vel speciei conveniat essentiae 
secundum quod per modum partis significatur ut 
nomine humanitatis vel animalitatis. Et ideo dicit 
Avicenna quod rationalitas non est differentia, sed 
differentiae principium; et eadem ratione humanitas 
non est species nec animalitas genus.  
Now notions like genus, species, and differentiating 
characteristic attach to something that can be 
attributed to this demarcated singular. So general 
notions like genus or species can’t attach to essence 
as a component part (expressed by words like 
humanness or animalness). This is the reason Ibn 
Sina says logicalness is not a differentiating 
characteristic but a source of differentiation, and for 
the same reason humanness is not a species and 
animalness not a genus. (De ente et essentia III) 
 
 
Essence can be seen in two ways. According to its concept (secundem rationem 
propriam) and according to its being in this or that thing (secundum esse quod habet in 
hoc vel in illo). Essence when seen in the first way is neither one nor many, because 
neither one nor many is essential to it. Rationality, for example, is essential to humanity, 
but one or many is not, if it were humanity could not be both in an individual and in 
many individuals. Essence seen in the second way has two ways of being: in the thing 
and in the mind. Kind is attributed to it as existing in the mind, as the individual thing 
cannot be said to be a kind (only to be of a kind). Humanity therefore is the kind of 
essence Socrates has, the kind being attributed to Socrates’ essence as it exists in the 
mind. 
 
Human nature (or essence) seen in the first way, i.e. according to its concept, is not 
essentially a kind, because all implied in human nature is attributed to Socrates, and 
Socrates is not a kind. A human being, is, in contrast, according to its concept or 
definition, an animal (not ‘a kind’). In fact there is nothing that is essentially a kind. A 
kind (and the other logical notions, genus and differentia) only are accidents of the nature 
as existing in the mind. 
 
These two ways of seeing essence could be seen to correspond to the two aspects of the 
intellect: ratio and intellectus. The formal object of the intellect (intellectus) including 
both is truth. Ratio is the discursive capacity of the intellect, which argues, deliberates 
and concludes, whereas Intellectus is the intuitive capacity, which comprehends first 
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principles and things. Ratio forms the concept in an account or definition, and names its 
product or activity after it (ratio) (translated with concept), whereas Intellectus intuits 
that of which an account is made, whether in the mind or in the thing, and names its 
intuitions after it (intellectus) (also translated with concept). To establish whether an 
account is correct or a definition adequate, a comparison must occur between the concept 
formed and the intuition available. This comparison is part of the rational activity we call 
thinking. When the comparison is complete a state of intuition result, a state we call 
knowing. Science reposes on both of these activities, but consists properly in the latter. 
 
The essence, therefore, is, as apprehended rationally, neither one nor many, neither 
existent nor nonexistent. (Husserl will say it is ideal). It is described in a formula or 
definition. When apprehended intellectually, however, it is existing in the mind or in the 
thing, being only ideally or formally one, capable of existing in both.  
 
The essence therefore has a two-fold mode of being: an ideal one and a real one. 
 
Is that true also about separated substances (substantiis separatis, scilicet in anima, 
intelligentiis et causa prima)? Their form does not necessarily differ from their essence, 
as it does in composite substances. Hence their essence does not have this two-fold mode 
of being. Their essence has only one mode of being: it is simple. As species and essence 
coincide in them, there can be only one of a kind, as they have no matter to individuate 
them. Thus there are only one angel in a species. But their essence does not necessarily 
imply their existence, only in the case of the First Cause.  
 
This implies that there is no intuition of them different from their definition. This, 
however, does not mean that they exist necessarily, only that if they have existence, it 
cannot be known from a comparison of intuition with the concept. They are, however, 
because they are not necessarily existing, composed of being and essence, and the 
degrees of actuality is what ensures that there can be a multitude of them. Their 
organization is in this understanding strictly hierarchical. 
 
But in God essence and existence does not differ. He is Pure Act. As there in his case also 
is no intuition of him different from his definition (His essence is his existence) human 
knowledge of him, in the sense of intuitions established on the basis of reasoning, is 
deficient. Not, however, because of His nature, which is super-intelligible, perfectly 
known by himself, Truth itself, but because of the deficiency of our intellects.  
 
The quest for being, metaphysics, therefore, inherited from Aristotle, concerns being and 
essence in composite substances, in separate substances and in God, whose being and 
essence is not separable. The concern with being hence translated into concern with the 
analogy of beings, analogia entis, and with Being. 
 
The systematic ‘thinking out’ the relationship between mind and being, between being as 
truth and being as being, has begun with the help of the Christian Revelation. 
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If essence is what the particular is and can be accounted for in a definition, and if, 
moreover, genus, species and difference by which definitions are given are added to 
essence is so far as it exists in the mind; stating the essence of something essentially 
involves correspondence with mind. In fact being as truth, in so far as it is 
correspondence between mind and thing, cannot be separated out from being as being, 
because being is intelligible. Even so Thomas carefully distinguishes being as truth from 
essential being at the beginning of De ente et essentia, because they are not the same 
thing. He also does this in De Veritate question 1, article 1. In the objections preceding 
the response arguments are presented for truth being the same as being. (1) The true is 
what is, says Augustine. However, to this it could be said that whereas they might be 
identical in meaning (secundum ratione), they do differ in their reference (secundum 
supposita). (2) What is and what is true therefore seems to mean the same. (6) Moreover, 
the true does not differ from what is either substantially (as what is, is true), nor 
accidentally (then there would be a genus common to being and truth which there is not). 
(7) Being true, in fact, does not add a determinant to being (i.e. truth has no specific 
difference in relation to being, it is not a kind of being), and it is broader, not narrower, as 
it is true, that what is not is not. Being broader means that it in no way is determined by a 
specific difference. 
 
However, even if the true is what is, if truth and being does not differ either substantially 
or accidentally, and if truth does not add to being, being is not just the same as being. 
When we define and prove, namely, we must rely on self-evident starting points 
(principia per se intellectui nota), if not the enterprise of defining and proving would 
regress infinitely, and there would be no science of anything. The most self-evident 
starting point is, according to Avicenna, being, in which all concepts resolve (illud autem 
quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum et in quod conceptiones omnis resolvit 
est ens). This is how every other mental conception adds something to what is, even if not 
from the outside (as what would be added would be).  
 
Thus something can add to being only when it expresses something in being which is not 
expressed in the word ‘being’. This can happen in two ways. (1) When what is expressed 
expresses something special of being, as each level of being and each category expresses 
a special way of being. Substance expresses something special of being without adding to 
being. (2) When what is expressed expresses something general of being it can happen in 
two ways: (a) It can express something general of being in se (either affirmatively as 
when we speak about a thing (res), or negatively when we speak about something 
undivided or one). It can also express something general of being in ordine aliud (i.e. in 
relation to something else). This it can in two ways, as (a) divided from (then we speak of 
some thing/aliquid) or as (b) corresponding to whatever it can correspond to, in particular 
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the human soul, which Aristotle says is ‘quodammoda omnia’. When it corresponds to 
the intellect it is truth, when it corresponds to the appetite it is good. 
 
What truth hence adds without adding it from outside being is therefore correspondence 
between mind and being (conformitas sive aedequatio rei et intellectus). 
 
Therefore truth can be defined in three ways: (1) As that which precedes truth, i.e. what 
is; (2) as that in which truth consists, i.e. correspondence between mind and thing and (3) 
as that which truth effects, i.e. what it reveals or manifests of what is. 
 
Secundum hoc ergo veritas sive verum tripliciter 
invenitur diffiniri.  
1. Uno modo secundum illud quod praecedit 
rationem veritatis et in quo verum fundatur, et 
sic Augustinus diffinit in libro Soliloquorum 
‘verum est id quod est’, et Avicenna in sua 
metaphysica ‘veritas cuiusque rei et proprietas 
sui est quod stabilitum est ei’, et quidam sic 
‘Verum est indivisio esse et quod est’.  
2. Alio modo diffinitur secundum id in quo 
formaliter ratio veri perficitur, et sic dicit Ysaac 
quod ‘Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus’ 
et Anselmus in libro De veritate ‘Veritas est 
rectitudo enim ista secundum adequationem 
quandam dicitur -; et Philosophus dicit IV 
Metaphysicae quod diffinientes verum dicimus 
‘cum dicitur esse quod est aut non esse quod 
non est’.  
3. Tertio modo diffinitur verum secundum 
effectum consequentem, et sic Hilarius quod 
‘Verum est declarativum et manifestativum 
esse’, et Augustinus in libro De vera religione 
‘veritas est qua ostenditur id quod est’, et in 
eodem libro ‘Veritas est secundum quam de 
inferioribus iudicamus’. 
This allows us to define truth or being true in three 
ways.  
1. Firstly, by referring to that which precedes the 
notion of truth but provides being true with its 
basis: and this is the way Augustine defined the 
true as what is; Ibn Sina, the truth of a thing as 
the possession of the existence established for 
it; and someone else, being true as the 
undividedness of existence and what is.  
2. In a second way we define it by referring to that 
in which the notion of the true is formally 
achieved: and in this way truth was defined by 
Isaac as the matching of thing and 
understanding; and by Anselm as rightness that 
only the mind perceives – rightness here 
expressing a sort of matching; and Aristotle 
said that we define the true by saying what it is 
and what it is not.  
3. In yet a third way we define being true by 
referring to the effect that follows on from it: 
and in this way Hilary defined the true as 
revealing and making clear what exists; and 
Augustine, truth first as that which shows what 
exists and again as that which we judge lesser 
things by. 
 
To the objections hence it can be said: (ad 1) Augustine defines truth exclusively as in 
(1), (ad 6) truth and being does not differ, but corresponds, and (ad 7) truth and being 
have the same extension, as what is true also in a certain sense exists. So truth is not 
broader than being. This last response reveals that the distinction between being as truth 
and being of the categories made at the outset of De ente et essentia is merely 
methodical. Here Thomas argues that because being as true is said about lacks, it must be 
distinguished from being of the categories. 
 
Truth, in fact, (De Ver. 1, 3) is found (1) first in understanding making connections and 
distinctions, then (2) in definitions based on this connecting and distinguishing (rational) 
activity. Thirdly (3) truth applies to things as matching God’s understanding and finally 
(4) to non-deceptive humans or words. 
 
Is this metaphysics of knowledge and truth a useful epistemology? Does it give any 
criteria for what is true? 
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What happened as metaphysics was modernized? 
 
 
Three main factors contribute to the making of modernity:  
 
(1) The transition from a land-based to a money-based economy (1350 – 1550). Trade 
gives rise to a need for capital and the taking of interest seems to be the economic device 
that ensures a steady flow of capital for the use in trading. The Church did not at first 
distinguish interest from usury, and therefore was seen as obstructing the development of 
society. As it itself financed large scale buildings (e.g. St. Peter in Rome) from the giving 
of indulgences and as whole orders lived from the benefices received from confession, a 
suspicion of abuse of power arose and fermented. This suspicion grew strong in particular 
among the merchant class who depends, for survival and for profit, on the taking of 
interests. The landed Aristocracy and the Crown also resented the Church because of its 
large lands.  
 
(2) The Reformation (1529 – 1550). Probably provoked by the resentment growing from 
the perceived abuse of power, and the consequent doubt about the divinity of the 
Institutional Church, Luther (1483 – 1546), Melanchton (1497 – 1560), Calvin (1509 – 
1569) and Zwingli (1484 – 1531) launched a program for church reform. It abolished 
‘popery’, ‘hocus pocus’, a central teaching authority, an idea of a single Christian 
doctrine, celibacy, monasticism and ‘pagan’ philosophical influence, in particular 
Aristotle’s. Its slogan sola fide, sola scriptura was intended to make people return to the 
sources of early Christianity, before tradition went wrong and theology went pompous. In 
Denmark the Reformation was introduced swiftly in one stroke in 1536, settling the 
power struggle between king and nobility. The confiscation of the lands by the Crown 
assured stability. In England it was introduced with scandal by Henry VIII. 
 
(3) The birth of modern science (1500 – 1750). Copernicus (1473 – 1543) revised the 
astronomical system of Ptolemaius (ca. 90 – 160), which was centred on the earth, by 
introducing helio-centrism. Tycho Brahe (1546 – 1601), an observing astronomer, laid 
the ground for Kepler (1571 – 1630), who analyzed the movements of the planets around 
the sun. Together with Galileo’s (1564 – 1642) elaboration of laws of movement and 
inertia, Kepler’s laws were of importance to Newton (1643 – 1727). 
 
Two other features were significant in characterizing the birth of modernity, one as a 
symptom and another as an additional cause of its unsettled times. The first is the witch 
hunting (1450 – 1700), triggered by the publication of The Witch Hammer (Maleus 
Malificarum) in 1489. The other is the ‘discovery’ of America (1492) and the consequent 
systematization of enslavement, first of Red Indians, then of Black Africans, purposely 
transported to the Americas. 
 
Descartes (1596 – 1650) thus lived in disturbingly hard times. The Reformation had, 
through La Fleche where he was educated, left its finest ideals imprinted on him. But he 
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was a Catholic, and a soldier in times where the main reason for going to war was 
religion (Thirty Years War). He saw the need to retire to philosophize and establish a 
philosophia naturalis, which could replace Aristotle’s. 
 
Meditations on First Philosophy (Meditationes de Prima Philosophia) (1641) expands 
Chapter IV of his previous On Method (Discours sur la Methode) (1637). Descartes’  
intention is to found philosophy on indubitable principles in contradistinction from mere 
beliefs. (Such foundation is necessary not only for theoretical reasons but also, and more 
obviously in Descartes’ time, for practical reasons. The Scholastic synthesis had 
practically allowed for the authority of the Church to weigh heavily in matters of too 
many kinds. The Reformers had challenged this authority, opening the way towards 
secular authority. Descartes’ argument runs as follows:  
 
(1) we must start from a self-evident or indubitable first principle.  
(2) To find it, methodical doubt must be exercised. This means that one should only accept as true, what is 
clearly and distinctly seen to be so.  
(3) I can doubt the existence of physical things, that the past existed, and that I have a body. These are all 
beliefs, accepted from sense, memory, and the capacity to distinguish dream from reality.  
(4) I can also doubt that what reason tells me is true, as certainty could be given to me by an evil god.  
(5) All that resists this methodical Scepticism is that I exist (because I doubt), and that all that appears to 
me, appears to me in the way it does. 
(6) My idea of God is that he is perfect. Such an idea cannot be due to someone imperfect (as I am). Hence 
God must exist independently (and be good). This is why I can trust reason. 
 
In a way Descartes is stating anew what Aquinas did in De Veritate 1,1: 
 
Dicendum quod sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet 
fieri reductionem in aliqua principia per se 
intellectui nota ita investigando quid est 
unumquodque, alias utrobique in infinitum iretur, et 
sic periret omnino scientia et cognitio rerum; illud 
autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi 
notissimum et in quod conceptiones omnis 
resolvit est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio suae 
Metaphysicae; unde opportet quod omnes aliae 
conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad 
ens. 
In defining what things are, just as in proving 
things, we must be led back eventually to 
intellectually self-evident starting points; otherwise 
both processes would go on for ever, spelling death 
to all science and all knowledge. Now Ibn Sina says 
our first mental conception – the most known as 
it were to which our analysis of all our 
conceptions leads us – is what exists. 
Consequently, every other mental conception adds 
something to what exists. 
 
Except that the idea of being as the starting point without which thinking and science is 
impossible is lost, and replaced by the idea of my being. God, also, has come to play the 
role of guarantor of this being, revealing religion’s deep impact on the conditions for 
thinking in the post-reformation period. Being needed and could have no guarantee for 
Aquinas, as it was the first, uttermost and fundamental, which guaranteed everything else.  
 
In so far as Descartes states the ‘same’ as Aquinas, he does so without knowledge of it. 
Modernity inaugurates with a systematic loss of memory: The old scholastics are no 
longer read – they are read in commentaries, in seminaries (having been drawn into the 
process of political division following the Reformation), in Hooker, Leibniz and 
Baumgarten and Wollf. The climate also has totally changed: reason has been 
fundamentally disturbed, and is fearful of loosing itself.  
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Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy 
The Cartesian Starting Point 
 
 
First Meditation: “About the things we may doubt” 
 
The Meditations are called ‘meditations’ because they are a thought experiment. They 
accept no external evidence, only the internal evidence of certitude. They are a variation 
of experience (considered as my experience) the purpose of which is to establish the 
nature of, or criterion for, certitude or evidence. Their result is ‘the Cartesian starting-
point’ – the indubitable I-sphere. 
 
Freedom allows Descartes time to think. His most important desire is to make himself 
free of false opinions and unwanted prejudices. Because without undertaking this process 
of affirming the foundations, he is unable to “establish something firm and constant in the 
sciences”. Descartes had been planning to do this for a long time, but as he considered it 
of much importance, he waited to undertake it until his age was that of a mature man. He 
explains:  
 
I could not hope, at a later stage in life, to be more fit to execute my plan; and henceforth consider 
that I was committing a fault if I were still to use in deliberation the time which remains to me for 
action.  
 
Descartes was undertaking the plan of a lifetime, when he sat down at the fire. Probably 
with ‘fear and trembling’ as one does in those cases. Free and alone, he applies himself to 
the destruction of former opinions in their foundations.  
 
Everything I have accepted up to now as being absolutely true and assured, I have learned from or 
through the senses. But I have sometimes found that these senses played me false, and it is prudent 
never to trust entirely those who have once deceived us.  
 
The foundations of all his previous opinions are destroyed by this destruction of faith in 
the testimony of the senses. But there are however something it is unreasonable to doubt. 
That I am here, have hands etc. If I doubt these, it seems as if I am mad. Yet the 
experience of dreaming makes me aware that there are times when I am utterly convinced 
about something, which, however, when I wake up, is realized as merely a dream.  
 
There is no conclusive signs by means of which one can distinguish clearly between being awake and 
being asleep. 
 
And by the same reasoning, although these general things, viz. eyes, head, hands and the like, may be 
imaginary, we have to admit that there are even simpler and more universal things which are true and 
exist, from the mixture of which, no more and no less than from the mixture of certain real colors, all 
the images of things, whether true and real or fictitious and fantastic, which dwell in our thoughts, are 
formed. Corporeal nature in general and its extension, are of this class of things, their quantity and 
size, and their number, as also is the place where they are, the time during which they exist, and such 
like. 
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Arithmetic, geometry and the other sciences of this nature, which deal only with very simple and 
general things, without bothering about their existence or non-existence, contain something certain and 
indubitable. 
 
Yet it is possible that God would deceive me every time I thought a mathematical 
proposition to be evidently true. Even if you don’t believe in God, but attribute our being 
to another cause, the lesser perfection of this cause makes it even more likely that I would 
be deceived all the time. Hence even mathematical reasoning is insecure. Descartes is 
then, for the sake of formalizing this argument from possible absolute deception, 
postulating an evil demon. 
 
 
Second Meditation:  
“Of the nature of the human mind and that it is easier to know than the human body” 
 
Even, however, if I doubt my senses and my judgement, I cannot doubt that  
 
by the fact that I was persuaded, or indeed by the mere fact that I thought at all, 
 
I exist.  
 
But there is some deceiver both powerful and very cunning, who constantly uses all his wiles to 
deceive me. There is therefore no doubt that I exist, if he deceives me; and let him deceive me as 
much as he likes, he can never cause me to be nothing, so long as I think I am something. So that, 
after having thought carefully about it, and having scrupulously examined everything, one must 
then, in conclusion, take as assured that the proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true, every 
time I express it or conceive of it in my mind. 
 
 
It is of course true, that when I conceive of someone deceiving me, I am not totally 
confused, but am in stead convinced of someone deceiving me. So in a sense it is 
Descartes’ evil demon argument that allows him certainty of the I. It is because (and in so 
far as) he constitutes the I as deceived by someone, that he has already constituted the I 
as someone like the deceiver who can be deceived. He is not aware of this 
presupposition, being so caught up with the horror of being ontologically deceived. Even 
so, he makes use of the starting point it affords him. There can be no doubt that I exist if 
he deceives me. There can be no doubt that I am bodily if he also tortures me. There can 
be no doubt that I have goals if he disappoints me, no doubt I have desires if he frustrates 
me, no doubt I think if he attempts to prevent me from doing so. The logic of (being in) 
opposition affords the clearest identity possible to the opposed, without the being aware 
how much meaning he ‘takes’ from this opposition.  
 
The Cartesian starting-point is therefore curiously humanist and individualist. It the 
modern certainty of the subject that post-modernity will react to, i.e. to Descartes’ 
unwarrented inclusion of the ‘I’ in the first principle from which all certainty derive. It 
often, however, understands its criticism to extend beyond modernity to metaphysics 
generally. 
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Husserl on Phenomenology 




• What is phenomenology? 
• Is phenomenology descriptive psychology? 
• Is phenomenology metaphysics? 
 
 
What is phenomenology? 
 
Historically it originated as a movement in Germany (Göttingen, with Husserl; Munich 
with Theodor Lipps), in proximity to the budding science of psychology. Husserl is 
above everyone associated with its cause – justifiably so, as he dedicated himself to begin 
it. His pupils in particular, and those who since associated themselves with them were 
proud of being given the name ‘phenomenologists’. They comprise Scheler, Reinach, 
Conrad-Martius, Lipps, Stein, Koyré, Hering, Von Hildebrandt, Pfänder, and others (Cfr. 
Spiegelberg and Sawicki). Those, more famous, perhaps, who have become associated 
with phenomenology are: Heidegger, Gadamer, Arendt, Ricoeur, Sartre, Levinas, 
Merleau Ponty and Derrida (cfr. Moran). The first are often referred to as ‘the early 
phenomenologists’ or ‘Göttingen-phenomenologists’. The second make up the ‘canon’ of 
‘continental philosophy’. 
 
Systematically it is programmatically exposed in Husserl’s Ideas (1913), in the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica article on phenomenology (in the fourteenth edition), in the 
Logos article (1910 or 11) and in the English foreword to Ideas (1931). It was, however, 
already present as a project for a laying a unified foundation of science in Logical 
Investigations (1900 – 01), and this work was the work that drew the early 
phenomenologists to Göttingen to study under Husserl before the first world war.  
 
Phenomenology is an investigation of phenomena as they appear, and hence an 
investigation of experience as such. It starts from pure logic (Logical Investigations), 
essence (Ideen) or the transcendental ego (English Foreword to Ideas). In the Cartesian 
Meditations (1929) this starting-point is interpreted as being that of Descartes, and hence 
finally establish philosophy beyond dogma (or doxa). It concerns itself with the essences 
of conscious life – i.e. what is necessarily so – while “bracketing” existence. It analyses 
phenomena in their essential structures with their noetic and noematic components, and 
takes this to lie within the sphere of the indubitable, which according to Descartes can be 
seen clearly and distinctly. 
 
 
Is phenomenology descriptive psychology? 
 
Descriptive psychology takes ideas to be realities of the soul (the psyche), that can be 
described as such. It is therefore an empirical science, even if it relies on ‘introspection’ 
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or ‘inner perception’. It describes what is there ‘in’ the soul. Descriptive psychologists 
sometimes did designate themselves as phenomenologists: they described the phenomena 
of the soul. 
 
Husserl insists that phenomenology is not a descriptive psychology. It does not describe 
the soul, or states of the soul, which both are realities constituted within pure experience. 
It investigates in stead pure experience as emanating from the transcendental ego, i.e. the 
ideal essential unity of pure experience as such. The way of achieving the required 
purification is to suspend ‘the natural standpoint’ by the ‘reduction’ and bracket the 
existence of the objects experienced by the ‘ēpoche’. In this way what is achieved is pure 
appearance as it appear – and this is what phenomenology is concerned about, not 
realities of the soul. 
 
Phenomenology in contrast with descriptive psychology is neither ‘psychologistic’, nor  
‘naturalistic’, its starting point in the transcendental ego overcomes both. 
 
 
Is phenomenology metaphysics? 
 
Whereas all transcendences are suspended in the phenomenological starting-point (that of 
God, that of the World and even that of the Eidetic Realm) the entire eidetic realm cannot 
be suspended. Of its essential connections we have in fact apodictic evidence; it is 
accessible to pure intuition. Eidetics – investigating essences or eidē – is part of 
phenomenology, because it informs thinking, to the point where without it, there could be 
no experience and no science of experience. 
 
When Husserl understands phenomenology to be partly eidetic, he implies that essences 
can be separated – in the eidetic reduction – from being or existence. He retains ‘first 
philosophy’ as a designation for phenomenology and hence understand it to concern 
essence, but not existence.  
 
Aristotle understands essences (το τι εν ειναι) to be what being primarily is. 
Metaphysics, or first philosophy, therefore primarily concern essences. Aristotle’s ειδοσ 
was not directly a candidate for substance, but γενοσ were. Thomas translated eidos with 
‘species’, and used both terms (genus and species) in De Ente et Essentia to designate 
that which was added to essence as it exists in the mind, through which definitions were 
expressed. Ειδοσ was the Platonic word for what is over and above the appearances, and 
it is of course the word we find in ‘eidetic’. Husserl is therefore best understood as a 






Spiegelberg: The Phenomenological Movement, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976 
Sokolowski: Introduction to Phenomenology, CUP, 2000 
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Husserl on Phenomenology as the Foundation of Science 




• Phenomenology as foundation for science 
• The problem of intersubjectivity 
• The problem of empathy 
 
 
Phenomenology as a foundation for science 
 
 
In this book, then, we treat of an a priori science (‘eidetic’, directed upon the universal in its 
original intuitability), which appropriates, though as pure possibility only, the empirical field of 
fact of transcendental subjectivity with its factual experiences, equating these with pure intuitable 
possibilities that can be modified at will, and sets out as its a priori the indissoluble essential 
structures of transcendental subjectivity, which persist in and through all imaginable 
modifications. “Introduction to the English edition of Ideas”, p. 11-12 
 
 
Through the phenomenological and the eidetic reduction the field of this new science of 
transcendental subjectivity is discovered, in which all sciences, founded in their regional 
ontologies, find their place. Husserl’s idea of a region is that it is the sphere of objects 
comprised under the highest genus of a kind. These can be of two kinds: formal or 
material. The science of the formal region is logic (mathematics is part of this region), the 
sciences of the material regions are the various sciences. Hence the highest genus of 
material things gives rise to the regional ontology of material nature in which natural 
science is founded. Ideas II constitutes the various highest genera: material nature, animal 
nature (where under you find the body and psychic reality) and spiritual world. Ideas III 
was thought to attempt to found the various sciences in detail. 
 
 
The problem of intersubjectivity 
 
 
“I, the transcendental, absolute I, as I am in my own life of transcendental consciousness; but besides 
myself, the fellow subjects who in this life of mine reveal themselves as co-transcendental, within the 
transcendental society of ‘Ourselves’, which simultaneously reveals itself.” It is thus within the 
intersubjectivity, which in the phenomenological reduction has reached empirical givenness on a 
transcendental level, and is thus itself transcendental, that the real world is constituted as ‘objective’, as 
being there for everyone. “Introduction to the English edition of Ideas” p. 21 – 22. 
 
How can intersubjectivity reach empirical givenness on the transcendental level? Is 
whatever is given within the transcendental realm not precisely bracketing empirical 
existence? How do I on the other hand know of another subjectivity besides my own, co-
constituting the world with me, if it is not empirically? How can I within the absoluteness 
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of my own experience discover or have the experience of another experience which is 
just as absolute without my experience becoming relative precisely by this discovery? 
 
Intersubjectivity can only reach ‘empirical givenness’ on the ‘transcendental level’ if 
experience is not strictly either empirical or transcendental, and hence that the 
phenomenological reduction does not reduce (all) experience to transcendental 
experience. The way in which I know of other subjects, the way in which they are 
brought to my attention is in the act of empathy, which therefore is the act in which 
others are brought to empirical givenness on the transcendental level. 
 
If we take perchance the formation of the plain perceptual constituting of the Thing, whereof the 
correlate is the sensory thing set out with sensory qualities, we relate ourselves to a single stream 
of consciousness, to the possible perceptions of a single perceiving personal subject. We find here 
various strata of unification, the schemata of sensation, the ‘visual things’ of higher and lower 
order, which must be completely set out within this order and studied with reference to their 
noetic-noematic constitution, singly and in their interconnections. The uppermost stratum of this 
formation is that of the substantial-causal thing, a reality already in the specific sense of the term, 
but remaining always constitutively bound to one empirical subject and its ideal perceptual 
manifolds.  
The formation next above this is then the intersubjective identical thing, a constitutive unity of a 
higher order. Its constitution is related to an indefinite plurality of subjects that stand in a relation 
of ‘mutual understanding’. The intersubjective world is the correlate of the intersubjective 
experience, mediated, that is, through ‘empathy’. We are therefore referred to the various unities 
of sensory things already constituted individually by the many subjects, and thus in further 
sequence to the corresponding perceptual manifolds belonging to the different personal subjects 
and streams of consciousness; but before all the new factor of empathy and to the question how it 




The problem of empathy 
 
 
Stein’s motives for writing her dissertation on empathy were to elaborate this relationship 
between subjectivity and intersubjectivity by analysing the problem of empathy.  
 
Now the question needed to be settled: what did I want to work on? I had no difficulty on this. In 
his course on nature and spirit, Husserl had said that an objective outer world could only be 
experienced intersubjectively, i.e. through a plurality of perceiving individuals who relate in 
mutual exchange of information. Accordingly, an experience of other individuals is a prerequisite. 
To the experience (..), Husserl gave the name Einfühlung. What it consists of, however, he 
nowhere detailed. Here was a lacuna to be filled; therefore, I wished to examine what empathy 
might be. The Master found this suggestion not bad at all. E. Stein: Life in a Jewish Family, p. 269 
 
Her point of view elaborated from this dissertation became a challenge to Husserl’s 
idealism. Perhaps he refers to these challenges, when he says that challenges to his 
transcendental idealism (p.18) seriously impeded the reception of Ideas II, which Stein 
edited during her time as his assistant 1916-17. She, in fact, thought there was no point 
trying to found the sciences without an adequate understanding of the role empathy 
played in constituting the objects of theses sciences. Husserl, however, has nothing to 
retract (p. 19): he maintains that the other can be known as a transcendental fact.  
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Husserl 
Transcendental subjectivity and the ego 
 
 
• Transcendental subjectivity 







Under the title “a pure or transcendental phenomenology” the work here presented seeks to found 
a new science – though, indeed, the whole course of philosophical development since Descartes 
has been preparing the way for it – a science covering a new field of experience, exclusively its 
own, that of  “Transcendental subjectivity”. Thus transcendental subjectivity does not signify the 
outcome of any speculative synthesis, but with its transcendental capacities, doings, is an 
absolutely independent realm of direct experience, although for reasons of an essential kind, it has 
so far remained inaccessible. Transcendental experience in its theoretical and, at first, descriptive, 
bearing, becomes available only through a radical alteration of that same dispensation under which 
an experience of the natural world runs its course, a readjustment of viewpoint which, as the 
method of approach to the sphere of transcendental phenomenology, is called “phenomenological 
reduction”. Introduction to the English edition of Ideas, p. 11. 
 
 
Phenomenology is the seeking for the foundations of a new science, prepared for since 
Descartes but left undiscovered because the alteration of viewpoint required had not been 
fully unfolded. Husserl’s constant beginnings seek to redo the unfolding of this viewpoint 
by reiterating how the alteration takes place. This alteration, or readjustment, of the 
natural viewpoint is not the outcome, Husserl thinks, of any speculative synthesis. But it 
is achieved by what he call “the phenomenological or the transcendental reduction”. 
 
Throughout Ideas, Husserl seeks to restate this reduction. It being “the method of 
approach to the sphere of transcendental phenomenology” it is also the method through 
which transcendental subjectivity or transcendental experience becomes available. 
 
Exercising the εποχη we ‘put out of work’ the claim the natural world has on us. We are 
capable of that in freedom: Husserl uses a Nietzchean phrase: we are capable of 
‘Umwertung’ of the natural world, and as we bracket its existence we still keep the 
experience of it as something belonging to transcendental subjectivity. 
 
When I have performed the εποχη and the phenomenological reduction, transcendental 
subjectivity is seen in its absolute, independent being; the transcendent (natural) world as 
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Who am I?  
 
 
If we now perform this transcendental phenomenological reduction, this transformation of the 
natural and psychologically inward standpoint whereby it is transcendentalized, the psychological 
subjectivity loses just that which makes it something real in the world that lies before us; it loses 
the meaning of the soul as belonging to a body that exists in an objective, spatio-temporal nature. 
This transformation of meaning concerns myself, above all the “I” of the psychological and 
subsequently transcendental inquirer for the time being. Posited as real, I am now no longer a 
human ego in the universal, existentially posited world, but exclusively a subject for which this 
world has being and purely, indeed, as that which appears to me, is presented to me, and of which 
I am conscious in some way or other, so that the real being of the world thereby remains 
unconsidered, unquestioned, and its validity left out of account. Now if transcendental description 
passes no judgement whatsoever upon the world, and upon my human ego as belonging to the 
world, and if, in this description, the transcendental ego is absolutely in and for itself prior to all 
cosmic being (which first wins in and through it existential validity), it is still at the same time 
evident that, at every conversion of meaning which concerns the phenomenological-psychological 
content of the soul as a whole, this very content by simply putting on another existential meaning 
becomes transcendental-phenomenological, just as the latter, on reverting to the natural 
phenomenological standpoint, becomes once again psychological. 
 
 
The reduction suspends the natural ego – i.e. anything of me that belongs to the natural 
world is left unconsidered. If the transcendental I is absolutely in and for itself – prior to 
all cosmic or natural being – all its contents, when they put on another existential 
meaning, becomes transcendental phenomenological. They revert again to the 






The crux of the matter is whether the transcendental I really is absolutely in and for itself 
prior to all cosmic being. How can it be, if we have bracketed all existence?  
 
Its being must be other than cosmic or natural. Husserl makes use of the word being in 
two ways, to designate the absolute being of the transcendental sphere and to refer to the 
dependent natural sphere. He does not explain what these to uses of the word being have 
in common: he has no ‘dictionary entry’ on the term being. It makes the reduction seem a 
reduction from one form of being to another, of natural being to transcendental being, 
justifiable perhaps as a parallel to Aristotle’s reduction of being to substance? In fact 
Husserl does not pretend his enquiry to concern being qua being, but in contrast 
transcendental subjectivity. Therefore we are left with the question: is the study of being 
qua being part of the study of transcendental subjectivity or is transcendental subjectivity 
part of the study of being qua being? 
 
As what the two types of inquiry has in common is their concern with essence, it is not 
surprising that it is the question of the essence of being (or the meaning of being) which 
is going to occupy both Heidegger and Stein as two inheritors of the Husserlian heritage. 
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Edith Stein: 
From phenomenology to metaphysics  
 
 
• On the Problem of Empathy  
• Beiträge and On the State 
• After 1925 
 
 
On the Problem of Empathy 
 
 
All controversy over empathy is based on the implied assumption that foreign subjects and their 
experience are given to us. Thinkers deal with the circumstances of the occurrence, the effects, and 
the legitimacy of this givenness. But the most immediate undertaking is to consider the 
phenomenon of givenness in and by itself and to investigate its essence. We shall do this in the 
setting of the “phenomenological reduction”.  
The goal of phenomenology is to clarify and thereby to find the ultimate basis of all knowledge. 
To reach this goal it considers nothing that is in any way “doubtful”, nothing that can be 
eliminated. In the first place, it does not use any results of science whatsoever. This is self-evident, 
for a science which proposes ultimately to clarify all scientific knowledge must not, in turn, be 
based on a science already extent, but must be grounded in itself. On the Problem of Empathy p. 3. 
 
 
Empathy, the act in which foreign experience is given to consciousness, and which hence 
is the act through which the ego is enabled to accede to intersubjectivity as a higher level 
of objectivity, is investigated by Stein within the phenomenological reduction. I.e. it is 
described and analysed as experience. This she sees as the goal of phenomenology: to 
clarify experience so that the ultimate basis of all knowledge is found. The structure of 
intersubjectivity and the interaction of subjects are further problems to be investigated by 
phenomenology, as such structure and such interaction are reflected in experience as 
elements of it. (Husserl thought so too, but he never got round to publish his results along 
these lined, Ideen II).  
 
All of Stein’s early works –  
• On the Problem of Empathy (1916);  
• Contributions to a Philosophical Foundation of Psychology and the Humanities 
(1922) (for short translated as Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities and 
simply called Beiträge, with its two treatises “Psychic Causality” and  “Individual 
and Community”); and  
• An Investigation on the State (1925)  
– treats of the problem of how intersubjectivity is articulated or structured in so far as it is 
the condition for access to a higher level of objectivity. Their purpose is epistemological 
but their bearing social, and in this they foreshadow the “linguistic turn” and post-
modernity. They investigate, without using the word, the “social construction” 
(intersubjective constitution) of our world, and by doing so they contribute towards 
founding the sciences of psychology, the humanities and politics.  
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Beiträge and An Investigation on the State 
 
 
Psychic Causality investigates the interplay of causality with motivation and how the 
psychic energy is spent and restored.  It attempts to draw the line between how on the one 
hand causality occur within the psyche and is experienced within consciousness and on 
the other motivation is experienced and initiated. Our psyche, in fact, is experienced as 
this web of causal-motivational interactions, over which I have no despotic power (as it is 
causal), but in which nevertheless freedom is inevitably invested (in so far as it is 
motivated). The psyche as this web is the region and formal object of psychology. 
Clarifying the distinction therefore contributes towards founding it. 
 
Individual and Community investigates the phenomenon of how (psychic) energy (or 
power) circulates, how it builds up collective experiences, forms national (or other 
communal) characters and the spirit of the times. It investigates in other words the web of 
causal-motivational structures writ large in society and how they form communal 
experience, which is the region and the formal object of history, literature and all the 
humanities. Clarifying this contributes towards founding these sciences. 
 
An Investigation of the State investigates the phenomenon of how power (the causal-
motivational web incarnate in social relations) is institutionalised. It shows how 
community expresses itself or gains access to expressing itself, by way of acting in 
legislating, promulgating and reinforcing laws. The State is seen as a (self) expression of 
a community, an ideal reality realised by the community, in and through the circulation of 
power including response to values. 
 
 
From 1925 to Finite and Eternal Being 
 
 
Stein was baptised 1922, and no way opens for her in academia. She was a woman and 
was therefore not allowed to “habilitate” on the three works above. She starts teaching 
Latin and German at a Dominican School in Speyer, where she also translates Newman’s 
Diaries and Thomas Aquinas’ On Truth. Encouraged to go for habilitation a second (Act 
and Potency) and a third time (Introduction to Phenomenology), she eventually gets a job 
in teacher training at the Marianum. Here she composes The Structure of the Human 
Person and What is Being Human? and projects her final work Finite and Eternal Being. 
She was dismissed because she is a Jewess, and enters Carmel in Köln, where she writes 
the Science of the Cross and finishes Finite and Eternal Being, which is in the press when 
she is taken to Auschwitz, but not published till after the war. 
 
Systematically she maintains the Cartesian starting point for her enquiry into the meaning 
of being.  
Mette Lebech (COPYRIGHT): Metaphysics I (2003) 
E-print archive, John Paul II Library 
 
Stein: 




• The meaning of being 




The Meaning of Being 
 
 
Husserl, as we saw, used the term ‘being’ about transcendental subjectivity, which he 
may understand to be in and for itself, and about the cosmic or natural world in its 
dependency on transcendental subjectivity (handout 21/3-2003). He does not engage in 
reflection in on what is common between these two kinds of being. Their relationship is 
obviously thought of as one of dependency – the being of the cosmic world is dependent 
on the being of the transcendental ego, which in turn is not dependent on anything else. 
 
Thomas would – to describe the relationship between different kinds of being, and hence 
also to characterise the relationship between intelligent being and being – talk about the 
analogy of being; analogia entis. He conceives of the universe as organised hierarchically 
in higher and lower according to “degrees” of being. Degrees of being depend on 
actuality or potentiality, so that actual being has priority in relation to potential being. 
Hence the goal has priority over the process, the final cause over the efficient, the active 
intellect over the passive, the fully formed over the potentially formed. Understanding is 
an activity that renders actual what is potentially intelligible, and because rational beings 
are capable of such actualisation, they have priority over beings, which are not. This is 
another way of expressing dependence: potential beings depend on actual ones for their 
actualisation, because their potentiality alone does not necessitate their actualisation. The 
faculty of the intellect, for example, is capable of knowing the reproductive cycle of 
crocodiles, but without it being actualised by actual crocodiles (or by actual knowledge of 
them) it will never know. This is how the object of the intellect actualises faculty or the 
power of the intellect (and why the phenomenological use of the world ‘act’ to designate 
the mental act corresponding to the object, makes perfect scholastic sense). 
 
If, then, we want to understand the meaning of the term ‘being’, as used by Husserl, we 
could use the Aristotelian/Thomistic division of it into either actual or potential; 
dependent or absolute. The two forms of being have this in common: that one is actually 
what the other is potentially. That is why they are either/or and cannot be separated.  
 
Haec autem comparatio invenitur esse inter animam 
intellectivam et phantasmata. Habet enim anima 
intellectiva aliquid in actu ad quod phantasmata est 
in potentia: et ad aliquid est in potentia quod in 
phantasmatibus actu invenitur. Thomas Aquinas: 
Now this is how our understanding mind relate to 
images [phenomena]. For in one respect the mind is 
actually what images are potentially; and in another 
images are actually what the mind is potentially. 
McDermot: Aquinas: Selected Philosophical 
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SCG 2,77 Writings, Passage 13, 
 
Aristotle included in his dictionary a fourth sense of being: 
 
Ετι το ειναι σεμαινει και το ον,
 το μεν δυναμει  
ρητον, το δ εντελεχεια  
των ειρημενων τουτον. 1017b 
Finally, “to be” or “being” mean 
sometimes that what is said is 
true potentially; and at other 
times actually. Hope, Book V, 7 
Again, “to be” <or “is”> means 
that some of these statements are 
made in virtue of a potentiality 
and others in virtue of an 
actuality. (Tredennick, Loeb) 
 
Being, according to him, is said of power or of achievement respectively. This is 
expanded upon in book IX/Θ. 
 
 
Act and Potency 
 
 
What is possibility, power, dynamism, energy, capacity (dunamij)?  
What is actuality, achievement, fulfilment, finalisation, perfection (entelekeia)?  
 
Aristotle does not seem to think that these are either accidents, substances or truths, as he 
distinguishes these from the fourth sense of being (which is the being is either possibility 
or actuality). Being is, in other words, said, not only about accidents, substances and 
truths, but also about power or achievement. Like truth is said about being whether it is 
accidental, substantial, potential or actual, actuality or potentiality is said about all being 
whether accidental, substantial or true. Being is in other words universally modal.  
 
Stein chooses this modal approach to being because this sense of being is accessible to 
both phenomenology and metaphysics. Of cosmic order, as well as of the inner life of 
phenomenologically reduced experience, act and potency are irreducible features. When I 
turn towards being, whether in the cosmic or in the transcendental sense, it “falls apart” 







When I turn toward being as it is in itself, it reveals to me a dual aspect: that of being and that not-
being. The “I am” is unable to endure this dual perspective: that in which I am is subject to change 
and since being and the intellectual movement (“in which” I am) are not separated, this being is 
likewise subject to change. The “former” state of being is past and has given way to the “present” 
state of being. This means that the being of which I am conscious as mine is inseparable from 
temporality. As actual being – that is, as actually present being – it is without a temporal 
dimension: it is a “now” in between a “no longer” and a “not yet”. But by its breaking apart in its 
flux into being and not-being, the idea of pure being is revealed to us. In pure being there is no 
longer any admixture of not-being, nor any “no longer” and “not yet”. In short, pure being is not 
temporal but eternal. 
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Stein: 
From the Transcendental Ego to the “pure I” 
 
• Formal Ontology and Transcendental Phenomenology 
• The finitude of temporal experience 
• Rational experience and faith 
 
Formal Ontology and Transcendental Phenomenology 
 
Potenz und Akt, Stein’s third habilitation-thesis for Freiburg 1931, forms the template on 
which Finite and Eternal Being is conceived. It embodies an earlier stage of the synthesis 
between classical and Christian metaphysics and modern thinking in the form of 
Husserl’s phenomenology. It is said about it that: 
 
Stein requires, like Husserl, a ‘starting-point’ (“Ursprungsbetrachtung”).. [but] for Stein the fact of 
the activity of the subject is not an occasion to suspend the question of the being of this immanent 
act, but this act itself, its actuality, discloses in its temporality, i.e. in its continual passing from 
potentiality to actuality, ex negativo the “idea of pure being”, which escapes temporality. (..) If 
Husserl takes the starting-point to clear the absolute immanent sphere of transcendental 
subjectivity, so Stein takes the constituting function of subjectivity as an occasion to show that 
subjectivity needs and refers to something that it is itself not. That it is constituting – and that 
means that it is “temporalizing” time and “decaying” subjectivity – refers it to something non-
temporal; that it constantly constitutes something refers it to something that does not coincide with 
its own immanent being. Thus Stein is brought to affirm that a sphere of pure being (a 
transcendent sphere in a second sense) must be distinguished from both the immanent sphere and 
the sphere of transcendence announced in the former as distinct. 
Thus is revealed that formal ontology is not, for Stein, as it is for Husserl, subordinated to 
transcendental phenomenology, but stands in a reciprocal relationship with it. Formal ontology is 
for Stein referred to transcendental phenomenology, in so far as this latter is not only treating of 
the relationship between the immanent and the transcendental spheres, but also must question the 
constitution of the entities of formal ontology. In the opposite direction is transcendental 
philosophy referred to formal ontology, not only because it is the task of the latter to determine the 
meaning of immanence in conjunction with the material ontologies, but because it falls to it to 
clarify in a general way the fundamental ontological concepts. (Hans Rainer Sepp: “Einführung 
des Bearbeiters” in Potenz und Akt, Herder, ESW XVIII, 1998, my translation). 
 
In Finite and Eternal Being, the idea of a formal ontology (dependant on but distinct 
from transcendental phenomenology) is superseded together with the idea that 
phenomenology provides an absolute starting-point and a universally applicable method. 
Stein is now investigating the idea of pure being and its disjunction into act and potency 
with regards to the transcendental as well as the immanent sphere. This does not mean 
that she gives up the idea of a starting-point within experience (she just cannot regard it 
as absolute), nor that she gives up phenomenology as a method (she just being as if it was 
a phenomenon). Her starting-point therefore is the confidence of being in its cosmic, 
social, political and religious dimensions, in the ‘fact of our own being’. Her method is 
phenomenological only in so far as her object being lends itself to being investigated 
phenomenologically, i.e. in so far as it appears. In so far as it is the opposite of 
appearance (as Parmenides, Plato and Husserl thought), it must be ‘heard of’ as 
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understood by others, and be interpreted from their understandings. Stein therefore 
conducts an analysis, which is both hermeneutic and phenomenological. 
 
The finitude of temporal experience 
 
The fully alive and present actual I is something of which I know. But it does not quite 
match up to the experience I have of my own experience. I live in time: remembering a 
past, living on a sword’s edge in the present, constantly turning present into past, and 
awaiting the next moment.  
 
If then our consciousness takes hold of the actually present, the latter reveals itself to us as 
something which, rising out of darkness, passes through a ray of light only to sink back into 
darkness. Or we may picture the actually present as the crest of a wave which itself is part of a 
mighty stream. These metaphors are evidently employed to describe a kind of being which 
endures but which is not actual throughout the entire extension of its duration.  
How are we to understand this last statement? There is something in what I am now 
which I am not actually but which I shall be actually at some future time. And what I am now 
actually I was at some time in the past, but not actually. In other words, my present being contains 
in itself the possibility or potentiality [Möglichkeit] of future actual being and presupposes a 
possibility or potentiality in my former being. My present being is simultaneously actual and 
potential being; and in so far as it is actual, it is the concrete realisation of possibility, which 
antecedes my present actuality. (Finite and Eternal Being, p. 38-39). 
 
I can only grasp the present within this flow or, as it were, surrounded by potentiality, in 
the same way as a point can only be understood in relation to its surroundings. The 
potentiality surrounding me, on the other hand, can only be understood in relation to my 
actuality now. So, I can only understand the ‘I’ of my present experience to be both 
actual and potential: if it were either on its own, it would not be. In fact I understand my 
experience as structured in units (units of experience) defined by their objects considered 
as transcending the stream. What I do now is something I have done for a while and will 
do for a while; something that holds its being from the actual present, however, as 
nothing is in the past or in the future. But how come I understand? How come I have 
access to something transcending the stream? What it is that we do reveals to us the idea 
of true being: we do understand, we do regard ourselves as experiencing something, and 
this what is actually with the actuality of the now. 
 
Rational experience and faith 
 
My own being, as I know it and as I know myself in it, is null and void [nichtig]; I am not by 
myself (not a being a se and per se), and by myself I am nothing: at every moment I find myself 
face to face with nothingness, and from moment to moment I must be endowed and re-endowed 
with being. And yet this empty existence that I am is being, and at every moment I am in touch 
with the fullness of being (Finite and Eternal Being, p. 55). 
 
This fullness takes on various forms: presence, amplitude and intensity, and it can fill my 
experience. However, anguish also can. It does so in pathological cases, but this does not 
seem a more rational response than the confidence of the child on a parent’s arm. The 
lack of an absolute starting-point in the fact of my own experience allows cosmic, social, 
political and religious elements to support my quest for the absolute foundation for 
experience. 
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Edith Stein: 




• The sources of the pure I 
• The idea of eternal being 
• Degrees of proximity to the fullness of being 
 
 
The sources of the pure I 
 
It is time now to ask: Whence comes this received being? According to what has been said 
concerning the life of the ego, there seem to be several possibilities of answering this question. 
Either the ego receives its life as well as the contents of its experiences from those “transcendent 
worlds” – external or internal or both – which manifest themselves in these experiences, or the ego 
owes its being directly to that pure being which is by itself and in itself [a se and per se], 
externally immutable, autonomous and necessary. This second possibility would not absolutely 
exclude the first one. If it were admitted that the ego is placed into and sustained in existence by a 
direct act of pure being, then there might well be assumed an additional dependence of its life on 
either the external or the internal world, or on both. A received being, on the other hand, that is 
independent of eternal being is inconceivable because, aside from eternal being, nothing exists that 
is truly in full possession of being. (Finite and Eternal Being, p. 55).  
 
 
My being as I experience it, suspended over a swords-edge between future and past, is 
never present in all that it is, but always potential in some parts. It is therefore 
experienced as received, as I cannot always conjure up at will its actualisation. I cannot 
make there to be a future, nor fully make it be what I like it to be, even if I must plan for 
it and act into it. Also, it is not due to me, that I have a past, even if I can remember it to 
be, and in my memory shapes “my past” as what has counted for me. The receivedness of 
my being is hence the fact that I must accept in confidence, that there is whatever there is 
– indeed accept in confidence the being of my limited being in its mixture with 
nothingness. It is only when I accept my potentiality, and hence my mixture with nothing, 
that I can see and say that I am something – because it is only in virtue of the potentiality 
surrounding me, that I am comprehensible as myself to myself. This potentiality is on the 
one hand the two transcendent worlds – the inner and the outer – and on the other hand 
that in virtue of which or of which I am potential: being as such in contradistinction from 
becoming. I depend on these, receive from them, because I am potential “of” them, i.e. 
can actualise some aspects of them. However, I cannot do this without it being them that I 
realise, i.e. without it being something that I realise in them. To the extent that I realise 
them, they are sources of my being. 
 
The idea of eternal being 
 
Those experiential units which are in the modes of becoming and passing away stand in need of 
the ego in order to attain to being. But the being they receive through the medium of the ego is not 
eternally immutable but is merely this very becoming and passing away, with an added crest of 
being at the moment of transition from the phase of becoming to the phase of passing away. The 
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ego itself seems to be closer to pure being because it attains not only to the crest of being for one 
single moment, but is sustained in it at every moment (though not, to be sure, as immutable being, 
but as being that constantly changes in its existential content). 
The ego is capable of arriving at the idea of eternal being not only by way of envisaging the 
becoming and fading away of its experiences, but also on the basis of the experienced specific 
nature of its own being, which is confined to an existence from moment to moment. The ego 
shrinks back from nothingness and desires not only an endless continuation of its own being but a 
full possession of being as such: It desires a being capable of embracing the totality of the ego’s 
contents in one changeless present instead of having to witness the continually repeated 
disappearance of these contents almost at the very moment they have ascended onto the stage of 
life. The ego thus arrives at the idea of plenitude [Idee der Fülle] by crossing out from its own 
being what it has come to know as privation. (Ibid, p. 56).  
 
The ego discovers itself desiring plenitude. Its partial realisations of particular things, the 
enterprise of realising (actualising, paying attention to) at all seems to express this very 
desire. Trying to know is trying to realise, and hence the desire to know is the desire for 
being or the desire to be. Inherent in this desire is found as its object the idea of pure (i.e. 
fully actual, not blended with potentiality) being, eternal being.  
 
 
Degrees of proximity to the fullness of being 
 
The ego, moreover, experiences in its own self various degrees of approximation to the fullness of 
being. Its present (what fills it now) does not always exhibit the same circumference. This may be 
explained by the fact that the ego may be comprised of more or less content at different moments. 
But there is also the further fact that the ego itself has at different moments a larger or smaller 
amplitude. And a similar observation may be made regarding the manner in which the ego is 
related to what it – still or already – firmly holds in its grip of the contents of past and future.  
To these differences in amplitude must be added those in the degrees of vitality in the ego’s 
present existence, i.e. its greater or lesser intensity of being. Proceeding intellectually beyond all 
the stages within its own reach to the outer limit of what can be conceived by the human mind, the 
ego is capable of arriving at the idea of all-embracing being in its highest degree of intensity. This 
procedure confirms our previous contention (pp. 49 – 50 above) that the continuous actuality of 
the ego admits of varying degrees. In comparison with the perfect being of the pure act, the actual 
being of the ego appears as an infinitely far removed and feeble image, but even in this remoteness 
from the primordial prototype there are found different gradations of being. And as against those 
rudimentary modes of being which we designated as potentiality, the actual being of the ego 
appears so clearly marked off that it would be highly inappropriate to include it in the category of 
potentiality, notwithstanding its gradations and the possibility of its passing over from lower to 
higher degrees. At most, one might be entitled to speak of a combination of actuality and 
potentiality. This “combination” however, is different from the one we referred to in our 
discussion of experiential units (p. 43 – 44 above). (Ibid, p. 56 – 57). 
 
The ego comes to experience, through its degrees of proximity to the fullness of being 
that it is, and despite its presence and actuality, itself as a mere shadow of pure actuality. 
The idea of a pure, actual I, in whom no potentiality would be mixed, therefore comes to 
it, as other, of course, than itself, but as radically possible and desirable, even as its own 
template or prototype. 
 
Husserl’s transcendental ego has thus been ‘split open’ – Stein distinguishes within the 
experience of the pure I, an I experiencing itself as finite and an ideal I beyond time in 
which all experienced contents would be fully present and actual.  
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• What we have done 
• What is (substance – being – phenomenon) 
• What is metaphysics? (phenomenology – ontology – theology)  
 
What we have done 
 
In the course of this semester we have studies three authors (Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas 
and Edith Stein) asking three questions: ‘What is metaphysics?’; ‘What happened as 
metaphysics was Christianised?’ And ‘What happened as metaphysics was modernised?’. 
To answer these questions we have studied auxiliary authors (Hildegard von Bingen, 
Descartes and Husserl) and reflected on the socio-economic reasons for the development 
of metaphysics.  
 
We have treated of being, mind and truth in their systematic connection, true to the 
determination of the subject of ‘metaphysics’ in Aristotle’s course on of first philosophy. 
He defined it as wisdom or knowledge concerning principles and causes, the science of 
being qua being, and as first philosophy, the common presupposition for the sciences. 
Metaphysics, therefore, is about ‘first things’, about whatever comes first in the order of 
things, the necessary presuppositions and knowledge or mind’s relativity to them. It is 
about the ultimate, the limit, that beyond which we can know nothing and cannot go. 
Hence it is striking that Aristotle makes ou)sia (substance) and not for example essence 
(to\ ti/ h)=n ei)=nai) that about which first philosophy is primarily. For Aristotle is the 
ultimate is substance and, if there exists immutable substance, such substance. That such 
substance must be mind arises from the fact that only mind is independent or perfect 
activity, and hence is first.  
 
The Christianisation of metaphysics placed the Aristotelian search for the ultimate in the 
context of God, lo/goj, having become man in Christ Jesus, making possible an 
anthropocentric individualism henceforth rendering inseparable Christianity and 
metaphysics. It is such confidence that lies behind Aquinas’ identification of being as the 
first concept of the mind, and of truth as mind’s correspondence with it. But with the 
Cartesian doubt resulting from the shattering of Christian unity the correspondence 
theory came to look tacky. Methods – in the new scientific style – had to be applied for 
truth to be discerned, and the theory of truth became concerned with criteria. This 
originated the splitting off of epistemology from metaphysics, and the consequent 
truncation of the mother science. In the face of factions warring about origins (God or 
state), metaphysics became feared and ridiculed as ideology. 
 
Phenomenology set out to provide anew the basis without which science no longer makes 
sense, and attempted to find in the Cartesian starting-point such basis. It is from here that 
Stein ‘rediscovers’ the centrality of being, common to the ‘I am’ and the being of the 
phenomena, and investigates its ‘appearance’ in the life of the mind. 
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What is (substance – being – phenomenon) 
 
For Aristotle being as being was primarily substance, and substance (ousia) “that about 
which everything else is said”. Substance, or primary being, is hence the primary unit(s) 
about which we talk: things. Not only things (substances) but all categories of being have 
essence – i.e. have something that they are (το τι εν ειναι). What things are, is known 
and explained by means of their causes and principles (εξ ου, ειδοσ, αρχη, τελοσ). But 
what things are is beyond their explanations. Even so, it is understood in them. 
 
For Aquinas being (esse) is what has this something that it is is - or rather, being is had in 
and through essence (essentia): essence is the means of identification of being, and truth 
is what reveals it. 
 
For Stein, phenomena are what appears, a phenomenon is the identification of what 
appears. This can only happens thought the identification of units of experience, which in 
turn are identified by their objects. These units of experience transcend in their 
transcendent objects experience: in so far as these latter explain the former. The objects 
are, thus, “that about which experience is had”. In so far as these objects identify 
experience, they are, whether as part of the inner or outer worlds, actually being in so far 
as they explain. The “essential realm” is what can be understood of what is. It is “what” 
is, as nothing can be something, unless it is “a what”. Units of experience and substances 
are identified in the same manner: by their essence, by what they are. They could not be 
identified in any other manner.  
 
What metaphysics is (ontology – theology – phenomenology) 
 
Aristotle was interested in being qua being, which was something that it was for it to be 
(το τι εν ειναι) for it to be anything. He saw no way of separating being (το ον) from 
what it was (το τι εν ειναι) for it to be, though he did not regard these to be identical. 
What it is for anything to be is thought (nouj) or understood by means of causes and 
principles, and the ultimate principle of explanation would be what it was to be for being.  
 
Aquinas explains that this principle is God, whose essence and existence coincide. This is 
how things can differ from Him, He being pure being, everything else being composite of 
essence and existence. In Him also being and truth coincide, as what it is for Him to be is 
to be. And this is revealed in being. 
 
Stein expresses this “grasp” of pure being as “groping search in darkness revealing to us 
the incomprehensible one as inescapably near”. I.e. in all explanation, all understanding, 
all experience: in what it is for anything to be. If metaphysics is the science of being as 
being, and being is “what it is for it to be”, metaphysics may start from phenomenology 
(describing what appears, and explaining it in terms of what it appears to be (its 
essence)). It may then proceed to systematise this knowledge in regional and formal 
ontologies, which serves as foundation for the sciences, and finally found these in 
absolute experience. Metaphysics has all these elements, as it is about the necessary 
conditions of experience (its reasons) and being is primarily what necessarily is. 
